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ABSTRACT
The medical industrial complex has historically contributed to the oppression and pathology of
queer and disabled people in a myriad of ways; through forced medication and
institutionalization, as well as denial of self-determination and identity. Queer theory and
disability theory both challenge modes of normalcy directly related to both queer and disabled
identities by using a lens that encompasses sexuality, gender, embodiment, health and
impairment. This paper will use queer theory and disability theory to analyze the ways in which
queer and disabled identities are connected and co-constructed, as well as, the ways in which
these intersections may expand our thinking in social work. The current diagnosis and
controversy around Gender Identity Disorder as a diagnosis in the DSM will be examined
through the lenses of queer theory and disability theory, to aid in the continued movement to
depathologize queer and disabled identities. It is the perspective of this paper that the liberation
of queer people is directly linked to the liberation of disabled people and that trans/queer justice
is disability justice.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the importance of an intersectional approach to identity politics and social
justice issues has become paramount in critical discussions and discourse. Intersecting identity
categories such as race, class, gender, sexuality and ability work on multiple and simultaneous
levels, acting together to create lived experiences of oppression and/or privilege and social
inequalities and/or advantages. The politics of intersecting and co-constructed identities began
with the writings of the Combahee River Collective, a black feminist lesbian organization. They
released a statement coining the term “identity politics” and stated that sexism, racism and
classism are inextricably bound together and that these interlocking systems of oppression cannot
be separated or ranked.
The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are
actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class
oppression, and see as our particular task the development of integrated analysis and
practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking.
(Combahee River Collective, 1977)
The Combachee River Collective’s statement was released in response to the white feminist
movement and their inability to speak to or for black women. The Combachee River Collective
wished to name and hold accountable the overt and underlying racism present in the white
feminist movement (Norman, 2007, p.105). The Combahee River Collective notably stated that
the liberation of black women would lead to the liberation of all people since, “our freedom
would necessitate the destruction of all systems of oppression” (Combahee River Collective,
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1977), spawning new discourse around identity, privilege and oppression, and radical ideas about
the interconnections of the struggle and oppression of all people.
Kimberle Crenshaw (1989), a prominent scholar in critical race theory, expanded upon
these earlier black feminist writings and recognized the importance of these connections and
overlaps, coining the term intersectionality. Intersectionality, as a concept, recognizes that
perceived group membership can make people vulnerable to various forms of bias, yet because
individuals are simultaneously members of many groups, complex identities can shape the
specific way each person may experience that bias. Not all prisoners are men, not all feminists
are white, not all immigrants are Latino, and not all lesbians and gays are white. An
intersectional approach provides a reminder that systems of oppression based on class, race,
gender and sexuality are bound together often working systemically, and that privileged
identities can have as much impact on lived experience as can marginalized ones.
As the Combahee River Collective understood, intersectionality can be used as an
approach to the liberation of all people, regardless of the issue or topic at hand. Many social
justice organizations have moved away from siloing issues into a single-issue approach to topics
that often only represent the experience of dominant groups. This intersectional approach to
social justice has expanded the dialogue to include voices and identities that are often silenced
and marginalized in movements. This has been most notable in the reproductive rights arena,
which has made a move towards reproductive justice, redirecting the focus of activism and
organizing to “recognize that the control, regulation, and stigmatization of female fertility,
bodies, and sexuality are connected to the regulation of communities that are themselves based
on race, class, gender, sexuality and nationality” (Silliman et al., 2004, p.4). Organizations such
as The Pro Choice Public Education Project (www.protectchoice.org), The Civil Liberties and
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Public Policy Program (www.clpp.hampshire.edu), National Women’s Health Network
(www.nwhn.org), SPARK! Reproductive Justice NOW (www.sparkrj.org), SisterSong
(www.sistersong.net), National Network of Abortion Funds (www.fundabortionnow.org),
National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health (www.latinainstitute.org), and others have
done collaborative work that highlights these intersections and the importance of intersectional
thinking in policy, advocacy and organizing. This ideology is reflected in written papers and
articles highlighting the ways in which coalition building across movements can have direct
effect on research, institutional change and the reproductive health care needs of marginalized
people (Gilliam, Neustadt, & Gordon, 2009; Shapiro, 2005; Sevelius, 2009; Townsend, 2010).
Of huge importance to social workers and social justice work, intersectionality allows us
to consider a range of social problems from a perspective of inclusion and understanding making
transformative change for diverse populations in many different settings, including health care
and mental health services (Murphy et al, 2009). An intersectional approach may function as a
mechanism of social justice by changing social institutions and policies that continue to maintain
an unequal practice of dominance and privilege (Anderson & Collins, 2004). Not only is
embracing an intersectional approach necessary for transformative social change, it is
fundamental for addressing concerns specific to a broad range of people, language, nationality,
race, ability, and sexuality that every social worker experiences in their work with clients.
Consequently, a paradigm shift that embraces intersectionality in the most comprehensive
manner is both appropriate and necessary to capturing the depth and breadth of human
experiences within the complex social contexts that social workers encounter when
working in increasingly diverse and global communities. (Murphy, et al., 2009, p. 2)
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Scholars and historians of marginalized groups place an emphasis on the inequities of
societal structure and power divided along lines of ability, race, class, gender, and sexuality.
As the study of disability has become a prominent field of academic inquiry, the connection to
and within other marginalized groups has recently begun to emerge in critical discourse and
across academic disciplines. Recent scholarship and social justice movements have begun to
make clear connections between disability, race, gender and sexuality, and the ways in which
systems of ableism, heteronormativity and racism are often used in interlocking systems of
oppression to create ideas and binaries of normality and deviance (Asch, 2004; Baynton, 2001;
Clare, 1999; Contreras, 2008; Kannen, 2008). Disability theory has begun to challenge and
expand, yet again, binary constructions and normative identities (Pothier & Delvin, 2006;
Samuels, 2002 Siebers, 2008; Snyder & Mitchell, 2006). In an intersectional approach, it is
necessary to consider a critical analysis of disability and ableism in relationship to other lived
experiences.
In recent scholarship some authors approach the intersection of queer theory and
disability theory from an additive model of identity, making connections between these two
academic fields through the experience and perspective of people who identify as both queer and
disabled (Clare, 2001; Whitney, 2006). This work has centered on the importance of visibility for
queer disabled people, as well as a challenge to the compulsory heteronormative assumptions in
popular disability discourse. The experience, scholarship, work, art and writing of people who
identify as both queer and disabled has had huge implications for the advancement of the social
justice movement, and has been crucial to the awareness and acknowledgement of the
intersections of these two fields.
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The literature emerging around disability requires us to consider the implications and
correlations of queer theory and disability theory for all queer and/or disabled people. While an
additive model of identity has been instrumental in beginning to bridge these two disciplines, the
similarities in queer and disability history and theory is not necessarily dependent on the
existence of people who are both queer and disabled. Similarities in experiential issues arise for
both disabled people and LGBTQ people including, familial isolation, high rates of violence,
issues around passing and coming out, pathologization by medical and mental health
communities, as well as increased stereotyping and discrimination. These are important
connections that can provide a link between these schools of academic inquiry. Recognizing the
intersections between ableism, transgender oppression and heterosexism is a crucial part of this
work. It is for these reasons that an intersectional approach to queerness and disability can
provide us with a multilayered complex understanding of all queer and/or disabled people.
Disability, like race, class, gender and sexuality, has been shaped by social, political and
economic forces. One of the most obvious ways in which disability and ableism are inextricably
linked across disciplines is the commonalities that disability history and identity has with that of
all other marginalized and oppressed groups (Baynton, 2001). Historically disabled people have
faced serious discrimination, segregation and exclusion in society, much in the same way as
other marginalized and oppressed groups. Examples of exclusion and violence throughout
history include, but are not limited to, the “ugly laws” that persisted in this country from the
1880’s well into the 1970’s which made it illegal for people with “unsightly” disabilities to
appear in public; laws excluding disabled people from legal marriage; denial of the right of
disabled people to parent; the eugenics practices of forced sterilization; and even full blown
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genocide in Germany during WWII (Burgdorf, 1980; Galagher, 1995; Pfeiffer, 1994; Schweik,
2009).
Disability studies, like other disciplines, include studies of history, individual narratives,
interactions of the oppressed and the oppressor, appropriation of language, internalized
representations of self, and the complex formation of modern day identity politics (Kudlick,
2005; Russell, 1998). Like the gay and lesbian movement, disabled people used the momentum
of the civil rights movement in the 1960’s to forge an understanding and language of identity
politics that fueled grassroots activism leading to political change in the decades that followed
(Shapiro, 1993). Despite gains through the civil rights era, institutionalized policies,
discrimination, violence and stereotyping still disadvantage both queer and disabled people
today.
Acts of violence perpetrated against queer and/or disabled people happens with a
frequency that is much larger then in the general population. There exists extensive research that
indicates that disabled people are at high risk for sexual, physical and emotional abuse
(Baladerian, 1991; Sobsey, 1994; Sobsey & Doe, 1991). According to a report from a 2007 US
Department of Justice report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics disabled people experience a rate
of violence that is 1.5 times higher than people without disabilities (Rand & Herrel, 2007). The
exact same rates of violence were found in a 1994 study, which also noted that comparatively,
disabled people experience more severe and extensive abuse than their nondisabled peers
(Sobsey, 1994). Sobsey (1994) also notes that disabled people may be 5 times more likely to
experience multiple victimizations than nondisabled people and disabled people have rates of
rape or sexual assault 2 times higher than the rate of nondisabled people (Rand & Herrell, 2007).
Other studies have also shown that disabled women are 2 times more likely to experience
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domestic violence, sexual assault and abuse than nondisabled women, disabled men, and
nondisabled men (Smith, 2008). Again, these studies show clear connections between misogyny,
class, ableism and violence.
A parallel experience had been found for LGBT people. A study of gay, lesbian and
bisexual adults showed that one quarter of men and one fifth of women had experienced hate
crime victimization based on their sexual orientation (Herrick, 1999). In its 2009 report the
National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs (2009) noted that murders of LGBTQ people were
at their second highest rate in the last decade and that 79% of the victims of LGBT hate crime
murders were people of color with the highest proportion of this number being transgender
women or feminine presenting, linking misogyny, racism, homophobia and transphobia. There
is substantial research that shows that over 50% of trans and gender nonconforming people
reported being the victims of sexual violence (Clemens-Noelle, et al, 2006; FORGE, 2005;
Garofalo et al., 2006, Kenagy, 2005). Many studies have noted the difficulty in estimating the
number of trans and gender nonconforming people in the US, making researchable rates of
violence quite difficult for this population (Stotzer, 2007). Despite this, researchers Kidd &
Witten (2008) point out that the violence and abuse trans people experience is a global problem,
one that is not localized to the United States and consider global trans violence not only an
extremely serious and immediate public health problem, but also “A genocide against a
consistently invisibilized minority population” (p.31). This quote is reminiscent of a long and
recent history of physical violence, sterilization and murder of disabled people. This includes the
genocide and mass murder of mentally and physically disabled people that took place in Nazi
Germany, as well as the eugenics movement in America that forcibly sterilized physically and
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mentally disabled people (Caplan, 1992; Gallagher, 1995; Lapon, 1986; Miller, 1996; Pernick,
1996).
The threat of violence and the implications for the reproductive justice of both groups are
well documented and are important considerations in discussions of homophobia and ableism.
Recognizing hate and violence related to disability and queerness is an important dynamic in
understanding the lived experience and continued threat of eugenics that hangs over the heads of
queer and disabled people, from the search for a “gay gene” to the counseling of women around
the “desirability” of having babies with impairments. High levels of violence in both
communities point to the ways in which queer and disabled identities are viewed as threatening
to larger societal structures and systems. While social desirability makes it difficult to create
reliable instruments on which to measure negative attitudes towards marginalized people it is
widely understood that stereotypes and discrimination adversely affect the lives and health of
queer and/or disabled people, with ableist and heteronormative and homophobic attitudes
pervasive on every level in society (Green, et. al, 2005; Harper & Schneider, 2003). “The
systemic and continued nature of ableism is evidenced by patterns of treatment that discriminate
against people with disabilities in such institutions as health care, education, housing and
employment” (Griffin, Peter, & Smith, 2007, p. 335).
It is part of social and legal convention in the United States to discriminate against,
ridicule, and abuse transgender and gender non-conforming people within foundational
institutions such as the family, schools, the work place and health care settings, every
day. (Grant, Mottett, & Tanis, 2010)
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Despite “how far we have come”, verbal harassment, discriminatory laws, discrimination in
employment, housing, health care, marriage, relationships, parental rights, sexual citizenship
rights, media, and environment are daily struggles for queer and/or disabled people.
The passage of anti-discrimination laws and hate crime legislation often do not change
societal perceptions of identities, and more often than not are no match to the obvious inequities
present in the structure. Laws and increased threats of punishment do not work to change the
bias, stereotypes and viewpoints of society, but merely attempt to prohibit certain behaviors. For
example, although it may remain illegal for employers to discriminate on the basis of ability
and/or sexuality this law does little to prevent this from taking place. A recent survey, “Injustice
at Every Turn: A Report of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey”, found that trans
and gender nonconforming people experience double the rate of unemployment than the general
population (Grant, Mottet, & Tanis, 2010). This same survey reports that 90% of trans and
gender nonconforming people experienced harassment, mistreatment, or discrimination on the
job; 47% of trans people reported experiencing an adverse job outcome such as being fired or
denied a promotion because of their gender identity; and 26% reported that they lost a job due to
their gender identity (Grant, Mottet, & Tanis, 2010). Even with anti-discrimination laws in
place, the current reality for trans and gender nonconforming people reported in this study proves
that these laws are having little affect in everyday life. This holds true for disabled people as
well, Deal (2007) argues that while more overt forms of discrimination against disabled people
have been reduced through policy and law, more subtle forms of prejudice remain prominent in
society, continuing to marginalize and oppress disabled people. Deal writes, “Failure to
incorporate subtle forms of prejudice into attitude change strategies may result in only blatant
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forms of discrimination being challenged, leaving insidious subtle prejudice undermining the
lives of disabled people” (p. 104).
Heterosexism, transgender oppression and ableism create lived experiences of exclusion,
marginalization, and devaluation. To be viewed as other by dominant cultural values, ideologies
and beliefs, can have an enormous affect on a person’s health and well being, potentially leading
to an “erosion of self esteem, limited achievement, isolation, difficulties in relationships and an
(eventual) internalization of one’s otherness (Gerrard & Javed, 1998, p.114). The negative
effects of othering, stereotyping and discrimination have been well researched and documented
in recent years, as contemporary health science has grown concerned with the mental and
physical effects of oppression which are now taken as the legitimate focus of health research and
intervention (Aguinaldo, 2008; Bahm & Forcuck, 2009; Herek, 1989; Herek & Garnets, 2007;
Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999). In addition to the lived experiences of physical violence that
many queer and/or disabled people are subjected to, the impact of these studies reveal that
significant mental and psychological harm comes from living in an oppressive and restrictive
structure and system, not from the individual identity in and of itself.
Lastly, it is well documented the ways in which the medical and mental health fields have
pathologized, abused and harmed both queer and/or disabled people (Conrad & Schneider, 1992;
Covey, 1998; Drescher & Zucker, 2006; Turner & Stagg, 2006). Institutionalization, forced
medication, sterilization, inhuman treatment, forced surgery, and continued silencing and
pathologizing from medical and mental health professionals are just some of the abuses
experienced by the LGBTQ and the disabled community. Both groups have been subjected to
forced “normalization” through a medical model that seeks to “fix” or “cure” all deviance from
the “norm”. While recent approaches to social work and mental health have rejected this
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pathology and abuse, many queer and/or disabled people still experience silencing, pathology,
and forced treatment from their providers. One only has to look at the continued and current
practices of conversion therapy for LGBTQ people, the surgeries performed on intersex babies at
birth, and continued denial and pathology around the sexual citizenship and license including the
right to birth and parent children that queer and disabled people face to see that the legacy of this
violence present in the history of the medical and mental health fields is still present today. It is
for these reasons why this paper considers disability identity, politics and theory in a discussion
of queer diagnosis.
It is the perspective of this paper that the liberation of queer people is directly linked to
the liberation of disabled people, and that the implications of this are hugely important to the
current work being done in the medical and mental health fields. Recognizing the history and
current legacy of the negative affect the medical and mental health field has had on the lives of
queer and/or disabled people will allow providers a continued consciousness and greater ability
to work towards the undoing of this past and current harm. This paper will use the “queer
diagnoses” contained within the DSM and the debates surrounding these queer diagnoses to
highlight the ways in which ableism and homophobia work hand in hand to oppress all queer
and/or disabled people This paper will attempt to expand the framework used by the medical and
mental health profession by focusing on allyship and self-determination through collaborative
work with queer and/or disabled people.
The following chapter clarifying will provide a framework for the ways in which the
interlocking systems of ableism, homophobia, heterosexism and transgender oppression affect
the lives of queer and/or disabled people and offer clarifying definitions of these terms. Chapter
Three in this thesis will look at the ways in which bias and pathology create and inform
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diagnosis in the DSM, with a specific focus on queer diagnosis. Chapter Four attempts to align
causes in common by looking at contemporary queer theory and disability theory and provides a
framework for the ways in which these theories challenge constructions of binaries and normalcy
by problematizing the ways in which queer and/or disabled identities are co-constructed,
pathologized and treated within the medical-industrial complex. Chapter five will begin by
looking at the major arguments around inclusion, exclusion and reform of GID in the DSM. In
conclusion, this thesis offers a new approach to working with trans and gender nonconforming
people that is rooted in disability theory, queer theory, and principles of social justice and
allyship.
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CHAPTER TWO
METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUALIZATION: IDENTITY POLITICS, OPPRESSION
AND COGNITIVE AUTHORITY

This chapter will serve as a basis for understanding terms by offering clarifying
definitions of some of the major ideas used throughout this paper. Identity politics and its
importance in the lives of LGBTQ and/or disabled people will be directly contrasted with some
of the more problematic ways in which the cognitive authority of the medical and mental health
fields pathologize marginalized identities. This chapter will provide the reader with a framework
for the discussion of homophobia, heterosexism, ableism, transphobia, and transgender
oppression with an emphasis on the ways in which these interlocking systems work together to
oppress queer and/or disabled people.
Queerness, Disability and Identity Politics
It is necessary to recognize that language is contentious, especially when dealing with
issues of identity and identity politics. Self-defining as an LGBTQI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans,
queer or intersex) person or as a disabled person, has new meaning in the current political
climate where words that were historically used to oppress, such as queer and crip, are used as
self-identification. This reclamation of language is rooted in resistance to the models that
created them. Self-identification has become paramount to identity politics partly due to the ways
in which language has been used both historically and contemporarily to pathologize and
oppress. Variations in discourse appear across contexts, disciplines, languages, culture,
locations, race, class, and a myriad of other factors, all of which influence the way people talk
about their own experience, see themselves in relation to the world, and understand themselves
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in context to it. In this way queer and disabled may be best defined by those who self identify as
such. In other words, queer and disabled people are those who use the language of queer and/or
disabled, in all of its forms, to define themselves and/or their experience.
As Thomas Siebers (2008) a prominent disability theorist notes, “ . . .identity politics
remains in my view the most practical course of action by which to address social injustices
against minority peoples and to apply new ideas, narratives, and experiences discovered by them
to the future of progressive, democratic society” (p.15). In many ways, identity politics is a
backlash against the cognitive authority of the medical and mental health fields with people
claiming power over their experiences and bodies by self-defining in a political and social
context.
Many queer and disabled people define themselves, rather than awaiting and receiving a
pathologized identity through the medical model. For example, people in the trans community
now value and place self-identification over diagnosis and pathology. Therefore, in many cases
people understand themselves as trans, transgender, transsexual, gender queer, gender
nonconforming, etc., prior to ever having been labeled, categorized or identified by the medical
or mental health community. This has been a huge shift in the last few decades, as historically,
this has not always been the case for LGBTQ people. For many years LGBTQ people, due to
lack of visibility, civil rights, community, awareness, and protections were isolated and
marginalized not only from other LGBTQ people but also from society as a whole. LGBTQ
identities were not often mirrored in society, and people in the medical and mental health fields
were often the first to name experience and pathologize identity for many people. Language that
was first used to describe, such as transsexual, gay, lesbian, and queer quickly turned from the
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language of description to the language of slurs and oppression when wielded by non-LGBTQ
people.
Identity politics, and an increase in awareness and visibility, have allowed people to
understand themselves outside of pathology, to reclaim the language of pathology, and to self
identify. As a slur, the word queer was originally used against gays and lesbians, to oppress and
marginalize them. As Judith Butler notes, the reclamation of the word queer allows, “those who
are abjected come to make their claim through and against the discourse that have sought their
repudiation” (1993, p.224). Self-identification with the word queer is claimed not only by
lesbians and gays, but also by those that it did not originally define, such as transsexuals,
bisexuals, BDSM practitioners, trans, gender nonconforming people and intersex people.
Like expansions in what is thought of as disability, queer has come to encompass a broad
range of sexualities and practices that fall outside of heteronormative lifestyles and sexualities
containing, trans and gender nonconforming people, people who engage in BDSM, gay men,
lesbians, bisexuals and intersex people. These embodiments of queer tend to collapse the binary
poles of understandings around sexuality and identity which include “chromosomal sex, selfperception of biological sex, masculinity and femininity, being the opposite on all these
dimensions of your partner, preferred sexual acts (insertive or receptive), procreative choice (yes
if straight, no if queer), sexual fantasies (dominant or submissive), and locus of emotional bonds
(should be consistent with sex and sexual orientation)” (Kassoff, 2004, p.162). As queer theorist
Sedgwick (1993) notes:
That’s one of the things queer can refer to: the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps,
dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent
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elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality, aren’t made or can’t be made to
signify monolithically. (p. 8)
Queer then can be seen not only as a sexuality or gender expression, but an identity that speaks
to one’s own feelings of dissonance with a multitude of binary constructions.
Since this paper also uses the words transgender and gender nonconforming with some
frequency a clearer definition of these terms and their relationship to identity politics will be
discussed here. In some instances, the word transgender is used to imply a gender identity that
does not match cultural expectations of one’s designated birth sex, but the word has come to
encompass a variety of experiences that fall outside of the socially constructed norms of gender.
Transgender is often used as an umbrella term to encompass the experiences of transsexuals,
cross dressers, gender queers, two spirit people, and bi-gendered people, giving it quite a broad
range of meaning. Transgender has little relationship to one’s sexuality. A person who self
identifies as transgender may identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, asexual, or heterosexual in
their sexuality, regardless of their gender identity or expression. This paper uses the term gender
nonconforming to,
Describe the self-identification of a spectrum of individuals. This term illuminates the
sociopolitical position of conforming to the gender binary and highlights the concept that
all people are oppressed by the socially sanctioned and imposed requirement to fit into
one category or the other, not just those who are differently gendered. The term includes
a spectrum of differently gendered people while acknowledging that not every person
who is differently gendered identifies as trans, transgender, or transsexual, and not every
trans, transgender, or transsexual person identifies as differently gendered. (Sennott &
Smith, 2011, p. 220)
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The term transgender emerged as an identity category rooted in resistance to the
psychopathology that surrounded other labels being used by the medical and mental health fields.
Typically in the medical model, trans people were labeled transsexual or transvestites, with sex
and gender roles on a distinct binary that placed emphasis on heterosexuality, physical
desirability and beauty (most notably for trans women) and a shift from one gender or sex to the
other (male to female or female to male). People who did not find that their experience matched
this medical trans narrative were not considered “true transsexuals” and were denied access to
gender affirming treatments. The term transgender came directly from the resistance that many
people in the community felt towards this imposed narrative of “transness” and the assumed
sexuality and gender binaries that it encompassed. The emergence of the word transgender,
Represented a resistance to medicalization, to pathologization, and to the many
mechanisms whereby the administrative state and its associated medico-legal-psychiatric
institutions sought to contain and delimit the socially disruptive potentials of sex/gender
non-normativity . . . The emergence of transgender falls squarely into the identity politics
tradition. (Currah, Green, & Stryker, 2009, p. 2)
Language in the community of disabled people also has been strongly influenced by
identity politics. Historically, one can trace the ways in which language such as cripple, spastic
and lame, has moved from technical meanings of diagnosis and description, to stigma and
ridicule, as it becomes leveraged as words of verbal abuse in common language and use. The
reclamation of the word “crip” by some disabled people as an identity politic is parallel to the
use of the word “queer” by LGBT people. “Queer and Cripple are cousins: words to shock,
words to infuse with pride and self-love, words to resist internalized hatred, words to help forge
politics” (Clare, 1999, p.70). Reclamation of the word crip as an identity has, like queer, moved
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outside of those who were originally defined by it. Sandahl (2003) notes, “The term ‘crip’ has
expanded to include not only those with physical impairments but those with sensory
impairments as well” (p. 27).
This paper will use the social model definition of disability that makes a critical
distinction between disability and impairment. From a medical perspective, impairment refers to
“any loss or abnormality of psychological, physiological, or anatomical structure or function”
and disability as “any restriction or lack (resulting from an impairment) of ability to perform an
activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being” (United
Nations, 1983: I.c.6-7). In this way disability may be physical, mental, cognitive, sensory,
emotional or developmental and may also include many types of chronic illness. Indeed the
category of disability itself remains quite expansive and complicated.
There are differences in type of disability (in a reification of the mind/body split,
disability is usually broken down as physical or intellectual), in impact (minor hearing
loss versus paralysis), in onset (disability from birth/gradually becoming
disabled/suddenly becoming disabled), in perceptibility (having a “hidden disability” and
“passing” as non-disabled versus being unable to hide a disability), in variability (most
disabilities change across time and space), and in prevalence (disabilities vary by sex,
ethnicity, age and environment). (Rohrer, 2005, p. 41)
Like queer, disabled is an unstable, expansive and fluid category. It is for this reason that many
disability theorists will use the phrase ”temporarily able bodied” to describe people who are
currently able bodied. Disability is a fact of human existence, and will affect everyone who lives
long enough to become an elderly person, or through the experience of a loved one becoming
disabled. This paper uses the term “temporarily able bodied” to bring awareness to the fact that
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people who are not disabled, may become so at any time in their lives due to illness, war or age.
This is to stress the fluidity of disability categories and to remind others that all humans move
through various stages of disability at one time or another in their own lives.
The medical definition of disability is problematic for several reasons, the most notable
being the assumption of “normality” and “functioning”. While this paper assumes a definition
of disability that includes this important distinction between disability and impairment, it is also
important to note that this author understands the complications of ascribing normality and its
conditions as universal. For example, what it means to have a basic level of functioning in a
highly industrialized society may be very different in a non-industrialized setting where traveling
distances to retrieve water, a necessity for movement and physical labor to maintain home, food
and warmth, may set basic levels of functioning much higher. This paper recognizes the need for
cross cultural comparisons, and criticisms of varying societies’ standards of structure, function
and ability to perform such activities (Wendell, 1996), while utilizing these distinctions between
impairment and disability.
Susan Wendell (1996) sums up the politics of disabled self-identification in this way:
It is important to keep in mind that some people who consider themselves disabled are
not identified as disabled by everyone else, and that not everyone who is identified by
other people as disabled (either for purposes of entitlement, purposes of discrimination,
or others) considers herself or himself disabled. (p. 25)
This same statement can easily be extended for queer people as well. Self-identification then
becomes the most reliable and least pathologizing basis for definition. “It is axiomatic that if we
do not define ourselves for ourselves, we will be defined by others- for their use and to our
detriment” (Lorde, 1984, p. 45).
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Interlocking Systems of Oppression
Ableism, transgender oppression, homophobia and heterosexism work together to require
bodies to fit into socially constructed expectations and requirements and are enforced through
binary systems in society evidenced through values, moral code, laws and policies which
disavow a range of gender expressions and identities, sexualities and abilities, enabling an
inequity in societal and institutional power. Ableism requires people to look a certain way,
function in a culturally “normal” way, and express themselves and think in these ways as well.
Heterosexism enforces rigid categories of sexuality, privileging straight heterosexual sex and
coupling with real institutional and societal advantages, oppressing both disabled and/or queer
people in a myriad of ways. Through these systems of oppression, white, heterosexual able
bodied males are often the default assumed and idealized identity, whereby all other expressions
of self are deviations that are pathologized, through a variety of individual and systemic levels
such as science, medicine, law and policy. Therefore, it is important to understand the ways in
which heterosexism, transgender oppression and ableism work together to oppress all queer
and/or disabled people. One can begin to understand this by discussing in depth the systems of
ableism, homophobia, heterosexism and transgender oppression and how they operate in the
lives of queer and/or disabled people.
Homophobia and Heterosexism
The term homophobia was coined in the late 1960’s by psychologist George Weinberg as
a clinical condition that encompasses the irrational fear and hatred of people who are attracted to
other people of the same sex (Weinberg, 1973). In common usage, the term homophobia has
been broadened over the years to include discrimination, violence, prejudice, and harassment
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towards LGB people. A more nuanced vocabulary seems necessary then to discuss and
understand the psychological, social and cultural processes that form oppression, and thus this
paper will turn to the use of the word heterosexism for this purpose. Throughout this paper the
term heterosexism is used to address the limitations of the term homophobia.
The term heterosexism acknowledges that these systems of fear and hatred are in fact
taught, learned, and normalized through socialization, making the issues much more complicated
than an “irrational fear”. Heterosexism has been defined as:
The overarching system of advantages bestowed on heterosexuals, based on the
institutionalization of heterosexual norms or standards that privilege heterosexuals and
heterosexuality, and exclude the needs, concerns, cultures, and life experiences of
lesbians, gay males, and bisexuals. Often overt, though at times subtle, heterosexism is
oppression by neglect, omission, erasure, and distortion. (Blumenfeld, 2007, p. 371)
Heterosexism encompasses all institutions, policies, values and beliefs that support
heterosexuality as the only “normal” expression of sexuality. Heterosexism is often used to
describe the “systemic displays of homophobia in the institutions of society” and “creates the
climate for homophobia with its assumption that the world is and must be heterosexual and its
display of power and privilege as the norm” (Pharr, 1988, p. 16). Heterosexism is often used to
describe the system of advantage or privilege afforded to heterosexuals in institutional practices,
policies and cultural norms that assume heterosexuality as the only natural sexual identity or
expression (Herek, 2004). Related terms also include heteronormativity (Warner, 1991) and
compulsory heterosexuality (Rich, 1986), both of which also critique the normalization and
privilege of heterosexuality on micro, macro and mezzo levels. Although the term homophobia
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is used at times in this paper, the reader should also assume an awareness of heterosexism in its
more inclusive form.
An important consideration in this discussion is that homophobia, despite its original
definition, is often about perceived violations of gender norms, not sexuality. Those most
frequently targeted by homophobia are men whose gender expression is culturally viewed as
feminine, and women whose gender expression is culturally viewed as masculine.
What most people view as homophobia in the form of hate crimes perpetrated against
LGBTQ people are usually based in some form of gender phobia, that is, that violence
and discrimination is based on fear of gender expressions and impressions. After all,
one’s sexual orientation is not visible but one’s gender expression is, making masculine
women and feminine men targets of hate crimes. (Sennott & Smith, 2011, p. 6)
Here one can see the ways in which socially constructed binary gender systems act as a central
creator of the opposition and oppression of not only lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgender and
queer people, but women and men who do not fit into the social constructions of gender as well.
Similarly, some scholars argue that homophobia is a central and organizing principle of
the cultural definition of manhood, “The word ‘faggot’ has nothing to do with homosexual
experience or even with fears of homosexuals. It comes out of the depths of manhood: a label of
ultimate contempt for anyone who seems sissy, untough, uncool” (Leverenz, 1986, p. 455).
Homophobia can be understood as more than a hatred of gay people, it is also a fear among men
of being seen as “not man enough”, or as not a “real” man. In this way homophobia is often
experienced through social expectations of gender roles. As noted in the following quote, gender
roles and homophobia are also bound up in issues of race and racism, complicating further, the
notions of masculinity.
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Homophobia is intimately interwoven with both sexism and racism. The fear sometimes conscious, sometimes not - that others might perceive us as homosexual
propels men to enact all manner of exaggerated masculine behaviors and attitudes to
make sure that no one could possibly get the wrong idea about us. (Kimmel, 2007, p.
329)
Socially constructed binaries force people into either/or sex, gender, and sexuality categories
based upon the norms of societal expectations and presentation. These binaries system serve to
maintain power and privilege for those people who conform to the norm while marginalizing and
oppressing those that do not. Societal privileges are received based on conformity to the roles
and expressions of socially constructed sex, gender and sexuality norms and oppression is
enacted through heterosexist laws, policies and practices.
Transphobia and Transgender Oppression
Transphobia is a fear or hatred of atypical gender expression or identity, or of people
embodying or expressing an atypical gender identity. Hill & Willoughby (2005) define
transphobia as “emotional disgust toward individuals who do not conform to society’s gender
expectations” (p. 533). As with heterosexism and homophobia, it is useful to note the
differences between transphobia and transgender oppression. Transgender oppression in contrast
to transphobia can be understood as societal discrimination, violence, exclusion and oppression
against individuals who do not conform to traditional norms of sex and gender (Sugano, Nemoto,
& Operario, 2006, p. 217). Transgender oppression is the oppression of people whose gender
expression, gender identity, and/or sex identity does not match the expectations of the dominant
norm of society.
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People who experience transphobia and transgender oppression include people whose
gender transgression is conscious or unconscious, deliberate or not deliberate, and/or
intentionally political or apolitical in intent. They include people who identify with terms
such as transgender, transsexual and gender queer, as well as others who do not identify
with any of these terms, but whose gender expression nevertheless transgresses gender
norms. (Catalano, McCarthy, & Shlasko, 2007, p. 221)
This system privileges cisgender (non transgender people) over trans and gender
nonconforming people. As an academic term, cisgender attempts to deconstruct the othering of
trans and gender nonconforming people by making visible the notion that all people have a
gender identity and expression. Cisgender is often used to acknowledge that for most gender
conforming people, gender expression is socially assumed and therefore invisible. This
privileges cisgender people in that there is very little reason to consider their gender identity and
its relationship to larger system and structures. This provides cisgender people with a relative
safety and comfort in regards to their gender identity that most transgender people do not
experience.
Transgender oppression takes place in a variety of ways. On the institutional level nondiscrimination laws do not protect most trans people in the United States, and as a result they
may be denied education, housing and services, with little or no legal protection. Trans people
also occupy a disproportionate percentage of the prison population, indicating targeting and
stereotyping by law enforcement, due to this huge gap in institutional protections from violence
and harassment. Transgender oppression happens both subtly through words and actions used to
reinforce gender norms, to more overt policing of gender expression and behaviors through
harassment and violence.
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Transgender oppression is maintained and perpetrated through rigid binary
understandings of sex and gender roles that are learned, taught and enacted in society. This
creates an environment where definitions of masculinity and femininity are enforced through
cultural and societal values, norms and policies, which then enable transphobia. Correlations
between transphobia and homophobia/heterosexism have been made, but transphobia includes
larger issues of transgressive gender roles and gender identity, not just sexual orientation. While
this paper will sometimes use the language transphobia, a larger understanding of transgender
oppression should be assumed.
An important side note in the discussion of transgender oppression are the differences in
attitudes towards trans masculine and trans feminine individuals that are related to large issues
around misogyny. If one accepts that western society is dominated by a heteropatriarchal
structure and acknowledges that misogyny and heterosexism are prevalent and damaging
structures, one can begin to look at the marginalization and victimization of trans women as
emblematic of larger structural and institutional problems inherent in a culture that devalues
femininity. As pointed out by Serano (2007), in a male centered gender hierarchy, where it is
assumed that men are better than women, and that masculinity is superior to femininity, trans
women pose a huge threat to these “norms”. Trans women then, simply by expressing their
femaleness and/or femininity, pose a threat to the hierarchy of maleness and masculinity (Serano,
2007). Trans men on the other hand, “naturally” would want to “be” men, because of the
presumed supremacy of maleness and masculinity. As a result of this misogyny, trans women
bear the brunt of jokes, harassment, violence, discrimination and hatred in the trans community.
In the simplest of examples, it is ok for women to wear “men’s” clothing, but as soon as a man
wears “women’s” clothing, they risk ridicule at best, and physical and institutional violence at
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worst. Coupled with the effects of race and class, trans women of color remain subject to the
most violence and discrimination in the community, showing the connections between sexism,
heterosexism, racism, class and transgender oppression (Gehi & Arkles, 2007; Grant, Mottet, &
Tanis, 2011; Xavier, Bobbin, Singer, & Budd, 2005).
Ableism
Ableism, or disability oppression, is the pervasive system of discrimination and exclusion
of disabled people. Ableism operates on the individual, institutional and cultural levels to
disadvantage disabled people and privilege temporarily able-bodied people. Those people who
are targeted by ableism include people with developmental, medical, neurological, physical and
psychological disabilities.
Ableism is deeply rooted in beliefs about the value of human life, health, productivity,
independence, normality and beauty, all of which are enforced through institutional values and
environments that are often hostile to people whose abilities fall outside of what is culturally
defined as normal. Ableism is perpetuated by a system of beliefs, policies, norms and practices
that create barriers to access, rights, life and choice for disabled people. Ableism is also
perpetuated by individual beliefs and actions, from paternalistic perspectives of sympathy and
pity towards disabled people, to feelings of fear and dread about becoming disabled (Griffin,
Peters, & Smith, 2007).
Ableism must be included in the analysis of oppression and in the conversations about
heterosexism, transphobia, and homophobia. Ableism cuts across all movements and dictates
how bodies should function against a mythical able-bodied standard. Norms of ability are
enforced through structures of racism, heterosexism, sexism, economic exploitation,
moral/religious beliefs and age. Ableism has been used to oppress of queer and trans people in a
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myriad of ways. Ableism has set the stage for: the institutionalization of queer and disabled
people as mentally disabled; intersexed babies to be routinely operated on at birth; communities
of color to be understood as less capable, smart and intelligent and therefore “naturally” fit for
slave labor; women’s bodies to be used to produce children, when, where and how men need
them; disabled people to be seen as “disposable” in a capitalistic and exploitative culture where
they are not seen as “productive;” immigrants to be thought of as a “disease” that must “cured”
because it “weakens” the country; violence, cycles of poverty, lack of resources and war to be
used as systematic tools to construct disability in communities and entire countries (Mingus,
2009).
Disability has a long history of being used as “the master trope of human
disqualification” (Snyder & Mitchell, 2006, p. 3) and ableism has been and continues to be
leveraged against blacks, women, Jews, immigrants, gays and lesbians, and intersexed people as
justification for exclusion and denial of basic rights as well as citizenship. Douglas Baynton
(2001) writes extensively about the ways in which disability has been used to deny claims of
citizenship to “undesirable” groups of people, including women, immigrants and people of color.
Disabled people fall outside the same boundaried norms of white heterosexual society as other
marginalized groups, and have been deemed deviant through social, economic and political
forces, “not only has it been considered justifiable to treat disabled people unequally, but the
concept of disability has been used to justify discrimination against other groups by attributing
disability to them” (p. 33).
The more that is learned about the history of disability, the legacy of ableism and its use
for the continued exclusion of all non normative (i.e. white, straight, male) bodies and identities
the more clear becomes the major role that disability has played in actually defining what it
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means to be “other”. Disability then becomes one of the most important aspects of
understanding the ways in which society constructs expectations of normality, and how this is
tied into political, social and economic factors. A critical discussion of race, class, gender or
sexuality, cannot be had without careful consideration of the ways in which disability has been
used in the social construction of the other. Ableism should be considered in every aspect of
academic inquiry for its deep connection to othering, exclusion and pathologization of nonnormative bodies and identities and its deep connections to heterosexism and transgender
oppressions. Critical questions to ask oneself when considering the interplay between
heterosexism, transgender oppression and ableism is what a “fix” or a “cure” means for queer
and/or disabled people directly intersecting queer rights and disabled rights with reproductive
justice. Issues around sterilization, health care, parental rights, sex and sexuality, and
reproductive health are paramount issues for queer and/or disabled people.
Ableism negates queer bodies, most obviously, trans and intersex bodies as different,
inferior, in need of “fixing” and/or a cure, by privileging certain types of idealized bodies over
others. Transgender oppression also continues to reinforce binary views of gender identity and
gender expression, thereby continuing to impose gender on disabled people by disallowing selfdetermination of gender and gender expression. Heterosexism continues to oppress all queer and
disabled people by privileging one type of relationship over others, negating these relationships,
and rendering invisible sexualities and relationships that fall outside of these normate categories.
As will be evident in the next section of this paper, the belief systems that enforce ableism and
heterosexism are difficult systems to untangle given their roots in medical and mental health
pathology and the role of science and medicine in the pursuit to “fix” and “cure” both queerness
and disability
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The Medical-Industrial Complex, Medicalization and Cognitive Authority
As stated previously, it is important to acknowledge the ways in which language has been
used against the very groups that it seeks to define, particularly in regard to queer and/or disabled
people through ableism, heterosexism and transgender oppression. Throughout history medical
and mental health providers have defined people and their experiences, without including the
voices and experiences of the group it seeks to define. This points to extreme inequities in power
and a legacy of homophobia, transphobia and ableism, with major social, political and economic
affects. Both queer and disabled people have been forcibly treated through medication, surgery
and sterilization. Both queer and disabled people have been housed in dehumanizing institutions,
and have been subjected to attempts to “cure” and “fix” bodies and identities. Queer and/or
disabled people continue to be silenced in their awareness and understanding of themselves and
their experiences through providers’ abuse of power and authority as well as poorly designed and
executed research that marginalizes, others, labels, names and categorizes queer and disabled
people (Conrad & Schneider, 1992; Covey, 1998; Drescher & Zucker, 2006; Turner & Stagg,
2006). The reclamation of words associated with identity is an important part of queer and
disabled history in relationship to the problematic legacy of the medical and mental health model
of pathology.
The medical-industrial complex is a term coined in 1971 by Barbara Ehrenreich in her
book The American health empire: Power, profits and politics. The term medical-industrial
complex refers to the multibillion-dollar health industry composed of doctors, psychiatrists,
hospitals, nursing homes, insurance companies, drug manufacturers, hospital supply and
equipment companies, real estate and construction businesses, health systems, consulting and
accounting firms, and banks. As defined by Ehrenreich, the concept of a medical-industrial
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complex conveys the idea that an important and primary function of the health care system in the
United States is to make a profit (Ehrenreich, 1971), making patient care, efficacy and selfmanagement a sideline to the bigger motive of money.
While the health care industry has certainly contributed to improvements in the health
status of the population, it has also strengthened and maintained the private sector of industry
and business for the wealthy, protecting a multitude of vested interests, including the big
business of drug companies which jeopardizes the care, trust and health of many patients
(Angell, 2004; Kassirer, 2005). Another critique of the profit driven motives of the medicalindustrial complex is that this system does not look at the contributions of social factors such as
environmental degradation, war, poverty, racism and other forms of oppression to illness (Jones
& Rainey, 2006; Kurtz, 2009). Searches for cures and miracle drugs provide profits that continue
to line the pockets of the rich and wealthy while ignoring the experiences and external factors
that contribute to illness and disability in the people affected.
The ‘rule of rescue’ posits that humans will make much larger sacrifices to save those
already in trouble than to reduce the statistical risk of future peril . . . our impulse for
justice favors assisting the person who is ill over the person who is poor, and we ignore
the critical task of preventing people from being either poor or sick. (Sage, 2010, p. 45)
Illness is solely located on the individual, placing blame on groups of people and doing little to
prevent the root causes of illness in society. Unrelenting searches for cures in attempts to “fix”
defective and marked bodies can often contribute to ableism, heterosexism and homophobia,
placing emphasis on desirability, a work force driven by capitalism and consumerism, sexualities
focused on reproduction and the denial of alternative experiences to the mythical white male able
bodied norm.
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The medical-industrial complex and its reliance on money and profits has a vested
interest in disability and disease and continues to medicalize what are often termed “deviant”
bodies and identities. McGann & Conrad (2007) define medicalization as follows:
Medicalization is the process whereby previously non-medical aspects of life come to be
seen in medical terms, usually as disorders or illnesses. A wide range of phenomena has
been medicalized, including normal life events (birth, death), biological processes (aging,
menstruation), common human problems (learning and sexual difficulties), and forms of
deviance. The medicalization of deviance thus refers to the process whereby nonnormative or morally condemned appearance (obesity, unattractiveness, shortness), belief
(mental disorder, racism), and conduct (drinking, gambling, sexual practices) come under
medical jurisdiction. (¶ 1)
Medicalization also expands the category of deviance to those who reject the offerings of the
medical-industrial complex. People who refuse psychiatric medications, resist “corrective”
surgeries, or reject standards of health and beauty may often be seen as deviant in this model.
The cognitive authority of medical and mental health providers often contributes to
medicalization, submission by patients to medicalization and the implications and label of
deviance.
Addelson coined the power of the medical and mental health field to describe bodies and
experiences to others and ourselves as “cognitive authority” (1983). Cognitive authority is often
based in heterosexist and ableist assumptions, that contain culturally constructed binaries of
normality around beauty, bodies, sex, gender and sexuality, that often are in direct contrast to
queer and/or disabled people’s self and identity. In the current medical-industrial complex,
disabled and/or queer people often lack a voice in this cognitive authority and must seek
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approval and validation from professionals, either by providing descriptions of symptoms and
ailments or internal senses of self and gender, or through stated desires to receive or not receive
surgery, drugs, and medical treatment.
A recent study in 2009 explored clinicians’ beliefs about patient self-management
(Hibbard, Collins, Mahoney, & Baker, 2009). The study showed that clinicians “strongly
endorse that patients should follow medical advice but are less likely to endorse that patients
should be able to make independent judgments or take independent actions” (Hibbard, et al.,
2009. p. 65). This information is directly related to clinicians’ perceived role in monitoring
access of gender affirming treatments to trans and gender nonconforming people by utilizing a
diagnosis of GID and policing identities. Clinician’s beliefs about patient self-management also
affects disabled people’s ability to self define their own housing, work and medical treatment in
accordance with their own internalized understanding of their own bodies and selves. What may
be inferred from this study is that clinicians do not like to give up the power inherent in their
role. They most often believe that they know what is best for their clients, and do not trust their
clients to know what is best for themselves. The author of the study notes:
The clinicians’ views, reported here, on the relative importance of patient competencies
are out of step with emerging professional codes and standards of performance. They are
also out of step with larger health policy directions that seek to engage consumers and
patients to be informed and activated managers of their own care. (Hibbard, et al., 2009,
p. 71)
It is important to consider the future of therapy with queer and/or disabled people as inhabiting a
role that includes working in partnership, and supporting clients in their roles as independent
actors with expertise in the needs of their gender and identity.
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Often, the very labels and diagnoses that are questioned and challenged by activists in the
queer and disabled communities are required for access to basic needs, and being “diagnosed” is
often the first step in receiving services. Based on these diagnoses many providers make
recommendations for treatments and cures, whether they be through surgery, psychotropic
medications, housing and living recommendations such as institutions or group homes, therapy,
and hospitalization. The goal of the medical model is to “cure” disability, to get rid of disability,
to “fix” the body. For many disabled people, acceptance of medical recommendations often
means conforming to society’s expectations of acceptable bodies and minds based on a binary
system of able versus disabled bodies, where normality is based on cultural standards of beauty
and acceptable “healthy” bodies. The view that all disabilities require some form of medical
treatment is widely held and this often requires, surgery, drugs and submission from the
“patient”. As Colligan (2007) notes, the medicalization of disability can lead to problematic
constructions of normalcy, pathology and oppression:
People with disabilities have been subjected to pacification through the medical gaze’s
fixation on essentialized and internalized bodily truths . . . The benevolence and charity
that have been extended to these individuals rests on their willingness, through medical
treatment, physical retraining, and mental acquiescence, to strive to achieve normative
standards of bodily appearance and physical, linguistic and cognitive use. (p. 485)
Because providers of health care benefits and services to disabled people are often the ones
defining who needs and is deserving of their help (Muller, 1979) rejection of treatment
recommendations can mean being labeled as “resistant” or “ungrateful”, even “unworthy”, of
basic assistance. Providers decide who is and is not considered disabled, and who is and is not
eligible for assistance, sometimes based on an individual’s decision of “normative” standards of
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functioning, presentation and appearance. Medical professionals, mental health workers and
social service providers often walk a dangerous line in this unequal distribution of power, and a
real danger lies in the potential for allowing bias and prejudice, clouded in paternalistic
sympathy, pitying and help, to affect the distribution of services to individuals.
In some cases, being labeled as disabled by providers may become extremely important
to people for access to basic services. This creates fear and concern imbedded in clients and
patients around accurately describing experiences and symptoms in order to be understood and
believed by doctors and properly diagnosed. Being denied disability status disqualifies people
from services that are often required for basic survival. One then must be “disabled enough” or
have the right kind of disability and the right symptoms that can be measured by standard tests
and procedures. Similarly one must be “impaired enough”, and providers must decide whether
or not a person is capable of working and/or performing all other tasks of daily living.
Obviously, there is considerable room for subjectivity here, as many people may not fit neatly
into providers’ ideas of disability, symptoms and/or functioning and assessments of the ability to
complete the “tasks of daily living” are subject to personal beliefs and cultural norms.
Often, “A patient is sent to a psychiatrist for evaluation when the doctor fails to
determine what is wrong. The psychiatrist, convinced that the doctor has found nothing wrong,
will naturally find a reason for the undiagnosed illness, a mental reason” (Jeffreys, 1982, p. 175).
Countless people who experience chronic pain and illness remain undiagnosed, and are often
labeled as mentally ill, their physical experience questioned and invalidated by doctors,
therapists, social service workers, and employers due to a lack of a clear diagnosis making
people ineligible for services and supports. The recent medical history and literature
documenting conditions such as fibromyalgia, multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS), and chronic
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fatigue syndrome (CFS) point to the contentiousness and problems surrounding diagnoses, the
limitations of biological laboratory tests, and troublesome debates concerning the psychological
versus the biological etiology of these conditions due to inconclusive and complicated testing
procedures (Hooge, 1992; Phillips, 2010; Wolfe, 2009). Science it seems is a less then universal
truth, and more often a social construction with bias and prejudice present towards the very
people it seeks to “define”, or help. Often this leads to the devaluation of people and their
experiences, misdiagnosis and continued and unbelieved suffering.
One of the vestiges of an individual model of disability, with deep roots in the workings
of charity organizations, are decisions around who is worthy of help and who needs help. Often
this is model is based on diagnosis, as well as an individual’s acquiescence to “fix” bodies that
do not conform to societal expectations of functioning and disability. This model places stigma
and blame on the individual with the implication of inherent fault or responsibility lying
somewhere within the individual. The assumption then for many disabled people (particularly
when talking about mental illness) has been that a person could control or change their situation
if they wanted to, but they are too weak, powerless, immoral and/or evil to do so.
The parallels of queer and disability pathology and othering have been most often noted
with parallels to disabled and intersexed people. In describing both queer and disabled
experiences of pathology in the medical-industrial complex Colligan (2007) notes:
Both are subjected to anomalous classification, medical management, silencing and
shame; both groups titillate the projected, and often repressed fantasies of outsiders, and
both intersexed and disabled organizations are challenging the assumptions that underlie
these negative images to reclaim their own impassioned, desirable and desirous bodies.
(p. 45)
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These similarities may easily be extended to other queer identities as well, particularly to those
that are trans and/or gender nonconforming.
The history of gender nonconformity in psychology and psychoanalysis has been
embedded in a pathologizing medical model. In the mid 20th century, gender difference was seen
as a pervasive mental disorder and even as psychosis (Siomopoulos, 1974), and a diagnosis of
Gender Identity Disorder (GID) remains in the current DSM-IV (APA, 2000). Trans activists
have argued that the diagnosis and criteria of GID eliminate the power of the trans person to self
identify, undermining the entire framework of the therapeutic relationship. GID as a diagnosis
implies that there are no healthy and functional trans people “who are able to seek medical and
surgical treatments for their own actualization without being labeled mentally ill” (Lev, 2005, p.
42). It is argued that a diagnosis of GID does not allow for diversity of experience of trans
and/or gender nonconforming people by reinforcing, “Stereotypical sexist and heterosexist
assumptions regarding normative male and female experience, and serves to reify a traditional
gender based hegemony” (Lev, 2005, p. 43). It has largely been acknowledged by postmodern
theory that gender is a social construct that lies on a continuum (Bornstein, 1994; Butler, 1990;
Freud, 1996). Many trans people are gender queer and do not identify within the binary system
of man or woman.
The medical approach to our gender identities forces us to rigidly conform ourselves to
medical providers’ opinions about what ‘real masculinity’ and ‘real femininity’ mean,
and to produce narratives of struggle around those identities that mirror the diagnostic
criteria of GID. (Spade, 2003, p. 28)
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GID can be seen as the medicalization and pathology of gender identity and limits the
expressions of self and narratives of experience, thereby imposing society’s patriarchal and
heterosexual norms and values onto trans people’s bodies and lives.
Nevertheless, many trans and gender nonconforming people must rely on the medical and
mental health profession for validation of their experience in order to seek gender-affirming
treatments such as surgery and hormones. Often, trans people come to therapy with a full
understanding of their gender identity, and more knowledge about the benefits and costs of
gender affirming treatment than their providers, but due to the medicalization of trans bodies,
they are still forced to seek gender identity validation from mental health providers.
Additionally, many trans people access therapy solely for the purpose of securing gender
affirming treatments, but as reported in the study mentioned above, many clinicians do not
believe in the ability of clients to self manage their care and to decide what medical procedures
they may or may not want and act as gatekeepers to surgery and hormones. The Standards of
Care (SOC) are the basis for the medical model in providing gender-affirming treatment to trans
and gender nonconforming treatment. The SOC are a set of guidelines or “recommended
requirements” for working with trans and/or gender nonconforming people (WPATH, 2001).
Professionals who adhere to these standards of care are known as “gatekeepers” and hold
authority to state whether or not a person is eligible, worthy of, or significantly distressed enough
in their present physicality, to be diagnosed with gender identity disorder (GID) in order to
qualify for gender affirming treatment. It is not enough to have an internal understanding of
your own gender, due to the legacy of the medical model; trans and gender nonconforming
people must be validated, approved, and believed by the cognitive authority of professionals.
Like disabled people, trans and gender nonconforming people worry about how to best present
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themselves to social service professionals in order to be diagnosed appropriately. This often
means “fitting” a provider’s definition of trans in a myriad of ways, from textbook identity
development, to binary gender presentation, and socially acceptable sexuality and practices. The
SOC and the medicalization of trans and/gender nonconforming people’s experience will be
discussed in more detail in the Phenomenon Chapter of this thesis.
Validation of one’s gender identity by professionals in order to access treatment is similar
to the ways in which a person’s physical symptoms and descriptions of illness must be verified
with tests, validated and proven for a proper diagnosis. If this cannot be accomplished to the
satisfaction of science, a person’s experience is devalued entirely and classified under a mental
or psychological condition. This is the last step for the medical model, when “truth” based in
evidence, cannot be sufficiently gathered. Psychiatry often receives people who cannot be
physically diagnosed by western medicine. The disease then must be in the mind. Arguably the
most stigmatized experience for any individual in society is to be labeled as mentally ill. The
medical model holds fast to rigid acceptance of binary systems and constructions of gender, sex,
and sexuality as well as a rigid role of acceptable “normality”. Disabled and trans bodies are
“other”, and in need of cure, rehabilitation and assimilation under a doctor’s watchful eye.
The authority to have one’s descriptions of self, experience and body, believed and
accepted as truth is often not in the hands of queer and/or disabled people. People in positions of
power who often diagnose, define and label an individuals’ experience hold cognitive authority.
Rarely is it held by those who are seeking services, or identified as patients. This creates an
unequal distribution of power, determining who receives benefits and/or treatments that may in
some cases improve the overall well-being and quality of life for some, and necessary survival
for others. These are just some of the examples of the ways in which the power of definition
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may have a large affect on an individual and/or groups economic, social and psychological wellbeing. In these contexts it is important to ask who is doing the defining, and what the functional
and ideological implications of this power of cognitive authority is.
This paper moves outside the realm of language used as self-definition by including
discussions of pathology and diagnosis. Therefore, this paper will be mindful and thorough in its
understanding of the words used to describe identity in order to discuss the politics of queerness
and disability. One cannot begin to talk about pathology of identity without considering the
systems in place that maintain systemic oppression, namely, heterosexism, ableism, and
transgender oppression, all of which work intersectionally to oppress queer and/or disabled
people.
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CHAPTER THREE
PHENOMENA: THE DSM, PATHOLOGY, BIAS AND QUEER DIAGNOSES

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (DSM-IV) is the main
classification of mental disorders used by mental health professionals in the United States and
increasingly around the world (Cooper, 2004). This book, the “bible” of psychiatry, clinical
social work, and psychology, “represents a major way of organizing psychiatric knowledge,
research efforts and therapeutic approaches” (Kirk & Kutchins, 1994, p. 71). While, in principle,
psychiatric diagnosis were created as tool to help both clients and providers, real attention must
be paid to the ways in which the power of language and cognitive authority is unequally
distributed across the hierarchies of diagnoser and diagnosed within the medical-industrial
complex. One must remember that, “a diagnostic label . . . has profound influence on what we
think of people so labeled and how they think of themselves” (Hare-Mustin, 1997, p. 105).
Diagnoses can exert a significant negative effect on the lives of people who are receiving these
labels, extending into the social, cultural and legal arena. Diagnostic labels can create problems
with employers and the military, can result in the loss of child custody, health insurance, and the
right to make decisions about one’s legal affairs and own medical care (Benjet, Azar, &
Kuerston-Hogan, 2003; Caplan, 2004; Simon & Gold, 2010). Diagnoses are also sometimes
necessary for people to access services and benefits in health coverage and income, and
instrumental in accessing treatment and support for trans and gender nonconforming people. The
cognitive authority of professionals, presumed objective, professional, and backed by research,
give the diagnosis enormous, often unquestioned and unchallenged, power with real and lived
implications for people’s experiences and lives.
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The DSM has become the pre-eminent organizing rubric not only for diagnosing patients
in the mental health system, but also for textbooks of psychiatry and psychology, for
deciding on insurance reimbursements, and for much government-funded mental health
research. This reliance on a single point of view, which has come to have the status of
law, should raise concern, no matter what its content. Such apparent unanimity seals off
opportunities for intellectual debate and dialogue from which new ideas flow and deeper
insights are generated. (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1997, p. 112)
The DSM represents the culmination of diagnosis and the ultimate authority in naming mental
disorders and its contents should be carefully considered and critiqued given the weight of the
material contained within. An open assessment of values and beliefs that are inherent in the
upholding and creation of diagnosis reveals that these categories are not created from neutral,
objective or universal positions. At their worst, as will be discussed later in this chapter,
psychiatric diagnosis can recapitulate sexism, homophobia, transgender oppression, and ableism
of larger society. Therefore it is unethical to assume that diagnoses are always useful (Braun &
Cox, 2005; Caplan, 2004; Conrad, 1992; Jiminez, 1997; Kirk & Kutchins, 1988; Offman &
Kleinplatz, 2004; Rosenberg, 2006). Critical thinking about the ways in which diagnoses may be
rooted in bias and assumption and the challenges present in diagnosing individuals is important
to the ethical and responsible work of social workers and providers in the mental health field to
prevent harm and future abuse (Cosgrove, 2004; Marecek, 1993).
A complete and full understanding of the problematic ways in which diagnosis has been
used, as well as the bias involved in the creation of these categories, seems essential to the
education of any competent and ethically minded therapist and yet it is largely missing from the
education of many professionals (Wiley, 2004). Additionally, while many students have
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concerns and conflicts regarding the DSM and diagnoses, schools have steadily increased
content in course work around the DSM since 1986, without necessarily expanding or
encouraging critical thinking around its cognitive authority (Newman, Dannenfelser, &
Clemmons, 2007). It is essential, then, given the implications inherent in the use of the DSM to
consider the ways in which these labels are created, who is instrumental in their construction, as
well as the biases and assumptions that may be instrumental in the creation of these categories.
Therefore this chapter will begin with some of these important and relevant critiques.
The DSM has undergone numerous textual revisions since its inception in 1952, with the
addition and deletion of a substantial number of diagnoses, categories and subcategories. In the
seven years between the 1987 and 1994 editions, for example, the number of categories and
subcategories increased from 297 to 374 (Caplan, 1995). Two other major revisions followed in
1994 with the publication of DSM-IV and again with a text revision of DSM-IV in 2000. The
American Psychological Association (APA) notes that these revisions “represented major
advances in the diagnosis of mental disorders and greatly facilitated empirical research” (APA,
2000, p. xxvi), citing empirical literature and data as the cause for these revisions. As the APA
increasingly justifies the expansion of diagnoses and categories on the basis of empirical
evidence and research, this research and evidence has routinely been called into question by
critics.
Most troublesome is the increasing number of links between drug companies, research
and diagnoses that are being uncovered in the medical-industrial complex. The interest of drug
companies in diagnosis is obvious, finding a diagnostic label that fits a drug’s reaction to a
person’s body and/or mind will make the marketing and FDA approval of that drug easier, faster
and more profitable. Drug companies have been linked to research money that is used to
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advance diagnostic categories and concerns about funding sources and outcomes of studies are
vast, thereby linking the DSM to questions of validity and reliability of diagnostic categories
(Angell, 2000; Bodenheimer, 2000; Davidson, 1986; Friedberg et. al., 1999; Korn, 2000). Even
more disturbing, is the direct link of strong financial ties between DSM-IV panel members who
are responsible for developing and modifying the diagnostic criteria for mental illness, and the
pharmaceutical industry.
Of the 170 DSM panel members 95 (56%) had one or more financial associations with
companies in the pharmaceutical industry. One hundred percent of the members of the
panels on 'Mood Disorders' and 'Schizophrenia and Other Psychotic Disorders' had
financial ties to drug companies. The leading categories of financial interest held by panel
members were research funding (42%), consultancies (22%) and speakers bureau (16%).
(Cosgrove, et al., 2006, p. 156)
These ties suggest monetary incentives for the creation of diagnoses and this should be cause for
alarm among professionals in the mental health field. Nosological boundaries are ever
expanding in today’s world, again calling into question the authority of diagnosis and the
reliability of books such as the DSM.
Though it has become routine, many Americans still find it unseemly that diagnosis can
be shaped in part by advocacy groups and Web sites, or that disease-targeted research
funding can be determined in part by lobbyists, lay advocates, and journalists, and not by
the seemingly objective and inexorable logic of laboratory findings . . . And in the private
sector, we have seen in the past half a century how pharmaceutical industry research and
marketing decisions have helped reshape both medical and lay notions of emotional
illness and its treatment. (Rosenberg, 2006, p. 410)
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This calls to mind the countless ads on television for drugs that can treat a variety of concerns
among the American population. This kind of direct market advertising of medications caters to
medicalization and the medical-industrial complex by luring in potential consumers and has an
incredible impact on the role of diagnosis and its relationship to society.
Additionally, the DSM has been criticized as increasingly becoming a tool for managed
care and insurance companies, as providers utilize categories and diagnosis that will secure
payments and justify medication prescription, regardless of symptoms and treatment planning.
Psychiatrists often change previous diagnoses based on medication changes and/or adjustments
with the justification that insurance will not pay unless the diagnosis matches the medication
prescribed. This issue has also been documented in literature suggesting it is a common problem
(Braun & Cox, 2005; Kirk & Kutchins, 1988; Pomerantz, 2003). Many therapists and clinicians
use diagnostic labels to aid in the choice of appropriate treatment and potential outcomes.
Unfortunately this method has not been proven reliable, but rather it has been shown that many
problems experienced by patients are not in fact psychiatric symptoms, and that there is little
relationship between diagnoses, patients’ problems, and the psychotropic drugs prescribed
(Harris, Hilton, & Rice, 1993; Quinsey, Cyr, & Lavallee, 1988).
Explaining and defining mental illness is a complex, ambiguous and controversial arena.
There are a wide spectrum of explanations and theories of mental illness including biological
perspectives (Andreasen, 1984), philosophical interpretations (Foucault, 1965), and rejection of
mental illness as anything other then a social construction (Szasz, 1961, 1970, 1974). In its
origins the DSM did not question what does or does not constitute a disorder but instead
represented an “accretion of psychosocial problems brought into psychiatric practice. Diagnoses
were there because they represented phenomena that psychiatrists treated and what psychiatrists
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treated was based on the field’s origins in medicine and penology” (Drescher, 2010, p. 452). In
1980 a major revision resulted in the publication of DSM-III, which sought to define what is and
is not a disorder using the criteria of dysfunction and distress and recognizing “disorders” as
existing in psychosocial circumstances and environments (Spitzer, 1981). While diagnoses,
symptoms, and classifications have changed throughout these revisions, the APA’s definition of
a disorder has largely remained the same. The APA (2000) states that a mental disorder,
Must currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological
dysfunction in the individual. Neither deviant behavior (e.g. political, religious, or
sexual) nor conflicts between the individual and society are mental disorders unless the
deviance or conflict is a symptom of dysfunction in the individual. (p. xxxi)
This definition has been seen as problematic because the DSM does not distinguish deviant
behavior that is caused by a psychiatric disturbance from deviant behavior that is labeled so due
to social customs and norms, but from a mentally stable individual (Kirk & Kutchins, 1996; Lev,
2005; Wakefield, 1997). Notably Lev (2005) argues that although the authors of the DSM-IV
do acknowledge the difficulties and limitations of defining abnormal and dysfunctional
behaviors they do not also attempt to offer a definition of mental health or functionality. Lev
(2005) states that, “the consequence and impact of this ambiguity on individuals who express
‘deviant’ political, religious, and especially sexual lifestyles has been under-examined” (p. 37).
What society views as deviant versus what is caused by illness becomes the discretion of the
clinician, leaving room for diagnosis to be based on personal bias and value systems. Many have
argued that the DSM, is over inclusive, lacks reliability and validity, is increasingly a tool used
for billing insurance companies and managed care, encourages pathologizing diagnostic labels,
pathologizes nonmedical conditions leading to unnecessarily medicating clients, and is often a
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way to pathologize other variations in human diversity and experience (Brown, 1994; Cooper,
2004; Kirk & Kutchins, 1996; Lev, 2005; Pomeroy, Holleran, & Franklin, 2003; Rapport, 2006;
Szasz, 1974; Wakefield, 1997). For the purpose of this paper and thinking critically about GID
in the DSM-IV, the most notable critique of diagnosis is its use as a tool of social control.
Philosophers, activists, and historians, have long critiqued diagnostic categories as not
based solely on medical knowledge, but largely on political and social factors (Foucault, 1965;
Illich, 1976; Stainton Rogers, 1991; Zola, 1972). Diagnoses reveal prejudice, bias and
assumptions reflective of societies’ norms and values at any given time in history, and concepts
of mental health and normality cannot be understood without looking at cultural norms and
values (Brown, 1990; Foucault, 1965). There is a substantial body of writing that argues mental
illness and diagnosis are social constructions, created to enforce social mores and norms.
Thomas Szasz (1970), a psychiatrist, and critic of the moral and scientific foundations of
psychiatry, asserts that the aim of medicine in enforcing social control, “We call people mentally
ill when their personal conduct violates certain ethical, political, and social codes” (p. 23).
Behaviors and conduct that receive attention from the psychiatric community are largely
dependent on the social climate of the time.
Throughout history, diagnosis and treatment have sometimes been used as a way to
control the behavior of and maintain power over certain groups of people. It has been noted that,
“medicalization is one of the most effective means of social control and that it is destined to
become the main mode of formal social control” (Pitts, 1971, p. 391). Many see the medical and
mental health fields as enforcers of these norms, and diagnoses as means of social control
(Conrad, 1992; McKeown, et al., 1998; Szasz, 1961). As Reynolds (1973) notes, professionals
through cognitive authority control conversations and discussions around the treatment of
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behaviors, removing them from the public realm and placing them solely in the hands of the
perceived psychiatric authority.
The increasing acceptance, especially among the more educated segments of our
populace, of technical solutions- solutions administered by disinterested politically and
morally neutral experts- results in the withdrawal of more and more areas of human
experience from the realm of public discussion. For when drunkenness, juvenile
delinquency, sub par performance and extreme political beliefs are seen as symptoms of
an underlying illness or biological defect the merits and drawbacks of such behavior or
beliefs need not be evaluated. (p. 220-221)
In effect, the voices, beliefs and experiences of people and individuals are silenced and
controlled by the dominant professional with the cognitive authority to “treat” perceived
disorders.
Psychiatry’s use of psychotropic medication is also an overt and obvious form of social
control. “Psychoactive drugs, especially those legally prescribed, tend to restrain individuals
from behavior and experience that are not complementary to the requirements of the dominant
value system” (Lennard, 1971, p. 57). Psychiatric medications are often prescribed to “fix” non
normative behavior, regardless of whether or not an individual perceives this behavior to be a
problem. For instance, a person may be treated with a mood stabilizer after a series of verbal
altercations with a partner. A child may be given an antipsychotic when they are unable to
control their anger or comply with authority. A woman may be prescribed an anti anxiety
medication when she describes difficulty interacting with male managers and bosses.
Prescribing drugs that control behavior, whether that behavior is restlessness, psychosis,
depression, sleeplessness, anxiety, or drug abuse, all require a diagnosis that states the deviance
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is a medical problem. This medical perspective of diagnosing illness individualizes problems,
rather then looking outside of the individual and into society for the root of problems and
behavior. “Rather then seeing certain deviant behaviors as symptomatic of problems in the
social system, the medical perspective focuses on the individual diagnosing and treating the
illness, generally ignoring the social problem” (Conrad, 1975, p. 19). Looking for complex
problems solely located in the individual rather then in the social system creates a vicious cycle
of patient and prescriber, since no medication, diagnosis or treatment given to an individual can
help shift problems that are often rooted in systemic oppression and violence, racism, classism,
misogyny, and homophobia. All of these critiques noted above, including the rise in
pharmacology and genetics, the pathology of deviance, the role of psychiatrist as expert, and
diagnosis as law, should give professionals due reason to pause in their use of diagnosis and
examine the root and implications of their use.
Nevertheless, health researchers continue to minimize the role of social influences on
their work (Caplan et al., 1992) and proponents of the DSM overlook the fact that psychiatric
disorders are cultural constructs (Chrisler & Caplan, 2002). Human beings need and desire to
name and classify things. As evidenced by the numerous revisions the DSM has gone through
and is currently undergoing, diagnosing and classifying mental disorders is not a “science”, but
largely subject to the mores and culture of the United States at any given point in history, making
the strong argument that diagnoses are culturally constructed. This constant revision is evident
proof of the contentiousness of diagnosis pointing to its use as not only a scientific document,
but also as a “revisable political manifesto for the psychiatric profession” (Pilgrim, 2007;
Wilson, 1993). Diagnoses are contentious, unreliable and often reflect bias in an attempt to
challenge, condemn and control non-normative behavior.
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Without re-examining the ways in which the DSM and psychiatry name, apply, and hand
out diagnosis which reflect racist, homophobic, misogynist and ableist oppression, professionals
continue to standby complacently as cognitive authority enacts social control over “deviant”
bodies, and experiences. It should be no surprise, or hidden truth to any provider that
historically, science, psychology, psychiatry and the “helping professions” have recapitulated
larger societal oppression and violence towards all oppressed and marginalized people (Caplan,
1995; Greene, 1995; Javed, 2004).
Racism in Diagnosis: Past to Present
Natural human diversity in race, gender, sexuality, and disability, have been pathologized
by psychiatry and enforced through diagnosis throughout history and this practice continues to
this day. The bias present in the modern day medical and mental health fields can be traced to
roots of racism, ableism, sexism, homophobia, and classism evidenced in diagnosis, both
historical and modern. An obvious example of the ways in which bias continues to inform the
ways in which diagnosis is used to oppress people is by looking at the history of racism in
diagnostic categories. Historically in the 19th century, diagnosis such as “drapetomania”, a
disorder that prompted slaves to run away, and “dysathesia ethiopica”, a disorder used to
describe slaves who were disobedient, refused to work, or fought with their masters (Cartwright,
1851), are obvious examples of diagnosis used as social control and reflecting overt racism.
More then simply a historical side note, these diagnoses were used to impact public law and
policy by dictating immigration and citizenship laws. Social control enforced through diagnosis,
was a major tenet of the first federal immigration act of 1882, which prohibited entry to the
United States of any “lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of himself or herself
without becoming a public charge”. Legislation in 1907 added “imbeciles” and “feeble-minded
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persons”, with regulations directing inspectors at entry points to exclude persons with “any
mental abnormality whatever . . . which justifies the statement that the alien is mentally
defective”. “Aliens” of course, were people of different races, and ethnicities and this criterion
for mental illness is skewed against a backdrop of racism and fear of difference imbedded in the
immigration policies of the time, allowing for a considerable amount of discretion and bias in the
justification for refusal of entry into the United States. An interpreter at Ellis Island noted, “over
fifty percent of the deportations for alleged mental disease were unjustified” based on “ignorance
on the part of the immigrants or the doctors and the inability of the doctors to understand the
particular immigrant’s norm or standard” (LaGuardia, 1961, p. 65). Arguments of the mental
and physical deficiencies of ethnic groups were used as arguments of the justification of their
exclusion (Grayson, 1913). Immigrants were more likely to be seen as “mentally defective” and
some believed that up to half the immigrants from southern and eastern Europe were “feeble
minded” (Baynton, 2001; Trent, 1994).
These arguments were again used in creating the 1924 immigration act which instituted a
national quota system based on ethnic origin and severely restricting immigration of peoples
from “undesirable” ethnicities and races by basis of diagnosis. Notably, during the late 19th
century foreign born people occupied an unusually high percentage of patients in mental
hospitals and asylums. For instance, 80% of the population at the New York Lunatic Asylum
between 1847 and 1870 were immigrants (Grob, 1973). The eugenics movement backed by
scientific racism claimed to prove the inherent supremacy of Anglo Saxons over other races and
ethnicities and informed psychiatric thinking and discourse around immigration policies.
Theilman (1985) describes the beliefs held by psychiatrists around early immigrant populations.
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There was considerable feeling among psychiatrists that the immigrant population
harbored a large number of ‘mental defectives’ who would taint future generations of
Americans if not restricted . . . Some practitioners were also deeply concerned about what
might happen to the state of American mental health if the racial mixture of the nation’s
population was substantially altered. (p. 299)
Psychiatrists often justified exclusion of immigrants from the United States by attributing mental
illness to non-Anglo people, often appearing before health organizations to endorse restrictions
(Bancroft, 1914; Dawes, 1925; Pratt, 1884; Russell, 1908; Swift, 1913; Woodruff, 1901). This is
exemplified in the quote below:
All those familiar with mental disease among the Japanese in California testify to the
remarkable tendency to suicide in that race, not only in depressed conditions but in
conditions in which suicidal tendencies, in other races, are not frequent. The strong
tendency to delusionary trends of a persecutory nature in West Indian negroes, the
frequency with which we find hidden sexual complexes among Hebrews and remarkable
prevalence of mutism among Poles, even in psychoses in which mutism is not a common
symptom, are familiar examples of racial traits upon mental diseases. (White & Jelliffe,
1913, p. 258)
In particular, Forester Pratt, a Michigan psychiatrist, politician and member of the Association of
Medical Superintendents of the American Institutions for the Insane (AMSAII), a precursor of
the American Psychological Association (APA) was focused on immigration restrictions among
the “defective people” of Europe and Asia. He offered a resolution to the AMSAII urging
Congress to restrict these “defective” classes of immigrants to the United States. His resolution
was passed unanimously (Thielman, 1985). This shows once again how psychiatric discourse
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and cognitive authority is inextricably and problematically linked to ideological views of racism.
It is important to connect this legacy of racism in diagnosis to 21st century abuses of cognitive
authority which still contain the legacy of these biased and racist beliefs.
Studies have shown that a disproportionate number of students of color are seen as
having a disability, mentally retarded, or emotionally or psychologically dysfunctional in
comparison to their white peers often largely due to bias in testing, ethnic and linguistic
differences, and larger issues of institutionalized racism (Blanchett, Klinger, & Harry, 2009;
Donovan & Cross, 2002; Ford, Blanchett, & Brown, 2006; Harry & Klinger, 2006). Compared
with all other groups combined, African American students are 2.99 times more likely to be
classified as having MR, 1.17 times more likely to be classified as having autism, and 1.65 times
more likely to be identified as having developmental delay (US department of Education, 2003).
In contrast, Hispanic students are about twice as likely as white students to be classified as
having MR and/or with a developmental delay (U.S. Department of Education, 2003). It is also
worth noting the ways in which schizophrenia became a highly racialized label in the United
States during the civil rights movement. A shockingly disturbing ad from the makers of the drug
Haldol in the 1974 depicts an angry African American man with his fist raised in the air and the
caption “Angry and Belligerent? Cooperation often begins with Haldol” (Metzel, 2010). This
ugly vestige of bias and racism continues today as reported by a 2005 Washington Post article:
Although schizophrenia has been shown to affect all ethnic groups at the same rate, the
scientist found that blacks in the United States were more than four times as likely to be
diagnosed with the disorder as whites. Hispanics were more than three times as likely to
be diagnosed as whites. (Vedantam, 2005, p. 1A)
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African Americans, by refusing to conform to a racist and oppressive society, beginning with
protests during the civil rights movement, were pathologized, and their anger was diagnosed as
mental illness. This trend, gone unexamined, continues to point to inherent and unchecked
racism in the medical and mental health fields, and African Americans continue to be diagnosed
with schizophrenia and medicated in larger numbers than their white peers (Hampton, 2007;
Neighbors, Jackson, & Campbell, 1989; Trierweiler et al., 2006). Here then is historical
evidence pointing to the ways in which ableism and racism overlap and the ways in which this
legacy of racism in psychiatry and diagnosis continues to operate currently in the medicalindustrial complex.
Misogyny and Sexism in Diagnosis: Past to Present
Debates around gender specific diagnoses, in particular in relation to women’s bodies and
functioning, also reveal social biases, misogyny and sexism present historically and recapitulated
contemporarily in the mental health field through diagnosis. As with the historically inherent
presence of racism in psychiatry, women’s experiences in the medical and mental health fields
are nothing short of an embarrassment to the scientific community. In the 1800’s diagnosis such
as neurasthenia, nervous prostration, dyspepsia, and hysteria were common diagnoses believed to
be caused by the wandering of a women’s uterus within her body (Ehrenreich & English, 1978;
Lev, 2005). Based on these diagnoses women were forced into institutions and asylums,
subjected to lobotomies, hysterectomies, clitoridectomies, and removal of their ovaries (Geller &
Harris, 1994), and gynecological surgeries were performed on women in mental hospitals up
until the turn of the 20th century (Barrus, 1898; Witte, 1902). “Women’s mental problems
almost always stemmed directly from their reproductive capacity, reflecting morally charged
traditional beliefs about women’s nature and roles” (Jiminez, 1997, p. 155), with childbirth and
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menstruation posing the biggest threats to women’s mental stability (Barrus, 1898; Tomilson,
1899). The stories of Frances Farmer, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and Elizabeth Parsons Ware
Packard reflect the common experience of women diagnosed with mental illness and confined
and “treated” against their will due to unorthodoxy in lifestyle. Notable, is that all of these
women are white, as African American women remain nameless, unheard, and unseen, but were
most likely even more adversely affected than their white peers by psychiatry and
medicalization.
The 1960’s saw changes in gender roles, new understandings of sexuality, and not
surprisingly, a resurgence in diagnosis based on bias and social control of women. As the
feminist movements began to challenge traditional stereotypes and gender roles, the diagnosis of
hysteria reemerged as a prominent diagnosis of women (Guze, 1967; Halleck, 1967). Hysteria
contained the same pejorative legacy of previous misogyny and diagnosis in the mental health
field as in the 19th century, and there were very few changes to this diagnosis and symptoms.
Like pathologizing the behavior of African American men who refused to accept racist laws and
behaviors, similarly, psychiatry sought to diagnosis women who dared to step outside of
traditional gender roles of wife and mother.
Contemporarily, women continue to be misdiagnosed and unfairly stigmatized with
Borderline Personality Disorder and Dissociative Identity Disorder, disproportionately among
women who have experienced trauma (Caplan, 1995; Kutchins & Kirk, 1996). The impact of
childhood sexual abuse, sexual assault, and domestic violence perpetrated and complicity
enabled by a misogynist and patriarchal society are often invisiblized through the use of these
diagnoses, placing the “disorder” on the individual (Herman, 1992; Miller, 1994). Shockingly,
premenstrual dysphoric disorder, (PMDD), remains a mental disorder in the DSM-IV, despite
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continued debate on the ethics, lack of empirical basis, and obvious social and political
consequences this has on women, including shaming of experience, enforcing social taboos and
pathology on the normal bodily functions of women, and the continued medicalization of
women’s bodies (Beausang & Razor, 2000; Kleinplatz, 2001; Koff & Rierdan, 1995; Offman &
Kleinplatz, 2004). It seems as though the menstrual cycle and reproductive cycles of women
have never lost their fascination for psychiatrists, and the cycles of oppression, misogyny, and
sexism of diagnosis continue on. Social workers, psychiatrists and medical and mental health
professionals, it seems, all would do well to openly acknowledge these embarrassments of
“science” and begin to work towards a model that consciously works to undo some of the
previous harm the “helping professions” have caused.
Homosexuality in the DSM: Past to Present
This paper will now turn to the history and current state of queer diagnoses within the
DSM, beginning with the history of the inclusion and subsequent removal of homosexuality as a
diagnosis. “Nowhere are the moral implications of etiological theories more apparent then in the
modern history of homosexuality’s status as a psychiatric diagnosis” (Drescher, 2010, p. 431).
Drescher (2010) also notes that across history discourse around homosexuality has been tied into
cultural values and norms.
Official pronouncements on the meanings of same sex behaviors were once primarily the
province of religions, many of which deemed homosexuality to be ‘bad’. However as
19th century Western culture shifted power from religious to secular authority,
homosexuality received increasing scrutiny from among others, the fields of law,
medicine, psychiatry, sexology, and human rights activism. (p. 432)
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By the early part of the 20th century, most psychiatrists viewed homosexuality as pathological
(Bieber et al., 1962; Rado, 1940, 1969; Ovesey, 1965, 1969). In 1952 the APA published the first
edition of the DSM (DSM-I), in which it classified homosexuality as a “sociopathic disturbance”
(APA, 1952). It appeared again in the DSM-II as a perversion (APA, 1968). This labeling of
homosexuality as a mental disorder and pathology in the DSM occurred despite a vast amount of
non-psychiatric research from people proving homosexuality as a normal and common
experience of humanity, which commonly presented as non-pathological (Ford and Beach, 1951;
Hooker, 1957; Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948; Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1953). American
psychiatry ignored this growing body of work and even expressed outward hostility towards
research and findings that conflicted with their own (Lewes, 1988). Homosexuality was
removed from the DSM in 1973, largely due to the work and protests of gay activists who
claimed psychiatric theories, which purported homosexuality to be a disorder contributed in great
part to homophobia and stigma in society (Drescher, 2010; Duberman, 1994). Activist Barbra
Gittings (2008) was at the forefront of this work and describes the climate for gays and lesbians
in the medical and mental health fields as such:
We were denounced as immoral and sinful. We were punished as criminals and
lawbreakers. We were labeled "sick" and needing "cure." We were mostly invisible as
gay, which made it hard for gay men and lesbians to develop good social lives and to
create a movement to battle injustice and prejudice. It's difficult to explain to anyone who
didn't live through that time, how much homosexuality was under the thumb of
psychiatry. The sickness label was an albatross around the neck of our early gay rights
groups—It infected all our work on other issues. Anything we said on our behalf could be
dismissed as "That's just your sickness talking." The sickness label was used to justify
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discrimination, especially in employment, and especially by our own government. (p.
289)
Gays and lesbians were subject to aversion therapy, lobotomies, shock therapy,
psychoanalysis, and incarceration in mental hospitals, all centered on the belief that
homosexuality was immoral, wrong, and harmful to both individual and society (Jay, 2000;
Terry, 1999). This is imperative to understanding the enormous implications of homosexuality
as a diagnosis, as well as the impetus for the struggle to resist such labels and medicalization by
the LGBT community. Gay activists disrupted the 1970 and 1971 annual meetings of the APA,
educational panels were held explaining the stigma caused through the diagnosis of
homosexuality and gay psychiatrists spoke against the diagnosis, appearing only in disguise for
real fear of the professional consequences of coming out (Bayer, 1981; Drescher, 2010; Gittings,
2008; Silverstein, 2009).
The controversy over homosexuality compelled the APA to consider and define exactly
what a mental disorder was and concluded that a mental disorder, “causes subjective distress or
were associated with generalized impairment in the social effectiveness of functioning” (Spitzer,
1981, p. 211). It was then decided that homosexuality did not fall under this definition of
disorder, and in 1973 the APA removed the diagnosis of homosexuality from the DSM-II (Bayer,
1981; Spitzer, 1981; Stoller, 1973). Although 1973 is often quoted as the year that
homosexuality was removed from the DSM, a closer look reveals that this is not entirely true.
The APA disturbingly released a statement making it clear that it was not endorsing
homosexuality as normal stating:
If homosexuality per se does not meet the criteria for a psychiatric disorder, what is it?. . .
Our profession need not now agree on its origin, significance, and value for human
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happiness when we acknowledge that by itself it does not meet the requirements for a
psychiatric disorder. Similarly, by no longer listing it as a psychiatric disorder we are not
saying that it is “normal” or as valuable as heterosexuality . . . No doubt, homosexual
activist groups will claim that psychiatry has at last recognized that homosexuality is as
“normal” as heterosexuality. They will be wrong . . . We will in no way be aligning
ourselves with any particular viewpoint regarding the etiology or desirability of
homosexual behavior. (APA, 1973, p. 2-3)
Clear in its belief that while homosexuality was not a disorder nor was it “normal”, the DSM-II
adopted the diagnosis Sexual Orientation Disturbance (SOD) in place of homosexuality. This
diagnosis saw homosexuality as an illness only if the individual themselves found their
homosexuality distressing and wanted to change it (Spitzer, 1981; Stoller, 1973). “The new
diagnosis served the purpose of legitimizing the practice of sexual conversion therapies (and
presumably justified insurance reimbursement for those interventions as well), even if
homosexuality per se was no longer considered an illness” (Drescher, 2010, p. 435). Contrary to
what one might think, removal of homosexuality as a diagnosis from the DSM did not end the
pathology of homosexuality by psychiatry.
In DSM-III, the diagnosis of SOD was dropped and changed to Ego Dystonic
Homosexuality and was not revised again until 1986, becoming Sexual Disorders Not Otherwise
Specified in the revised edition of the DSM-III (APA, 1980; APA, 1987). When SOD was
dropped in 1980, Ego Dystonic Homosexuality (EDH) took over as the new queer diagnosis,
“which referred to the subjective experience of unhappiness and contrasted with syntonic
behavior or one’s comfort with their same sex desires” (Lev, 2005, p. 41). Eventually, almost 14
years after homosexuality was supposedly removed from the DSM, EDH was removed from the
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revision of the DSM-III due to the difficulty of untangling the complicated arena of internalized
homophobia, that is negative views of homosexuality learned and internalized through and due to
the real and lived experience of stigma, bias, and violence as a homosexual person, and one’s
own true dystonia. So while it seems that the APA has finally accepted homosexuality as a
normal variant of human diversity, it again failed to let sexuality alone, and still to this day
includes the diagnosis of Sexual Disorders Not Otherwise Specified in the most recent version of
the psychiatric bible, DSM-IV-R.
The diagnosis of Sexual Disorders Not Otherwise Specified includes the criterion
“Persistent and marked distress about sexual orientation” (APA, 2000, p. 582). This criterion, as
Lev (2005) notes, is “presumably not commonly used to treat heterosexuals who are unhappy
with their sexual orientation” (p. 41). The APA through its continued inclusion of diagnosis
focused on the sexual lives of humans, perceives sexuality as deviant, non normative and
pathological, a problem contained within an individual, rather then purported as problematic
through oppressive societal forces such as homophobia, heterosexism, patriarchy and capitalism.
The pathology of difference continues, albeit under a new name.
Gender Identity Disorder and the DSM: Past to Present
Like homosexuality, medical scrutiny of gender non-conformity began in the 19th
century, and much of the current understanding of trans and gender nonconforming people is
rooted in the medical discourse that arose out of this time period. Notable sexologists of the time
including Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Magnus Hirschfeld, and Havelock Ellis “occupied
themselves with teasing out the fine distinctions between ‘sexual aberrations’ that have come to
be called homosexuality, transvestism, and transsexuality” (Hausman, 1995, p. 111). The goal of
these researchers was to decriminalize what was thought of as “sexual deviance” with the belief
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that sexual behaviors have medical, biological and scientific origins (Ellis & Symonds, 1897;
Havelock, 1897; Hirschfeld, 1910; Krafft-Ebing, 1886). As Lee (2008) explains,
Those who conducted this research expressed concern over the criminality of so-called
sexual deviances given that they believed such behavior to have medico-scientific
etiologies; indeed, early sexological research was driven largely by benevolent desires to
shift these sex paradigms from discourse around moral culpability to discourse around
medicalized study. Research during this era of trans discourse fixated upon classification
of discrete sexological conditions and ultimately resulted in a sort of sexualized
taxonomy that, in large part, persists today. (p. 450)
The classification systems that were developed were rooted in ideas of labeling, categorizing and
sub-categorizing identities in order to determine who is and is not eligible for sex reassignment
surgery (SRS).
By the 1920’s physicians in Europe began to perform the first sex reassignment surgeries
(Hertoft & Sorenson, 1978; Hirschfeld, 1923; Hoyer, 1933). It was not until 1952, when
Christine Jorgensen made national headlines in US newspapers when she returned from
Denmark a trans woman after undergoing SRS that trans identities and gender affirming
treatments became a seminal topic in the US medical and psychiatric field (Denny, 2004;
Drescher, 2010; Jorgensen, 1967; Meyer-Bahlburg, 2010). Jorgensen’s sex reassignment surgery
was the subject of a great amount of public and professional controversy and a report of her
surgery was published in the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1953 (Hamburger,
Sturup, & Dahl-Iverson, 1953). Following Jorgensen’s experience and the widespread reporting
of her SRS, numerous clinical papers and books were written on the subject of gender dysphoria
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and SRS (Benjamin, 1954, 1966; Green & Money, 1960, 1969; Pauly, 1965; Stoller, 1964). In
many ways, Jorgensen, made SRS and transgender people a salient issue in the United States.
Harry Benjamin is largely responsible for the developmental of the medical model of
trans identity with the publication of his seminal work, The Transsexual Phenomenon in 1966.
In his book he categorized two types of gender dysphoria, transsexualism and transvestism
(Benjamin, 1966).
Transsexuals were identified as people who had life long cross gender identity dysphoria,
lack of erotic cross dressing, strong dislike for their genitalia, a persistent desire for sex
reassignment surgery, and a sexual attraction to those of their same natal (birth) sex.
Transvestites on the other hand, were defined as heterosexual males who have a primarily
male gender identity and who cross dress for erotic reasons but expressed no desire for
SRS. (Lev, 2005, p. 43)
Benjamin’s classification system is important because he also distinguished “true” transsexuals,
those who requested SRS, from other “less severe” transsexuals that did not request or require
surgery (Benjamin, 1966). This is the origin of the still widely held belief in the medical and
mental health fields that all “true” trans people want or require surgery, thereby allowing the
cognitive authority of medical professionals the capacity to determine who is and is not truly
trans and therefore who is and is not eligible for SRS. Another major characteristic of
Benjamin’s classification system of transsexuals was misery, a desperate unhappiness and
depression present in character and mental status (Denny, 2004). Benjamin believed that
providing “true” transsexuals with medical intervention could alleviate some of the pain and
misery they experienced through their severe dysphoria, while psychotherapy was sufficient
treatment for milder cases of transsexualism (Benjamin, 1966).
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In 1966 a gender clinic was opened at John Hopkins University in New York to provide
transsexuals with SRS, and medical and psychiatric and psychological services to aid in their
sexual reassignment, and following suit, a number of other gender clinics opened around the
country (Denny, 2004). Research and diagnosis of gender related disordered began in earnest
with a zeal for classification of types of gender dysphoria (Lev, 2005). Classification of “true”
transsexuals became extremely important to the justification of gender affirming surgeries and
treatment, and many researchers noted that the most successful transitions happened when
people were classified as “true” transsexuals (Landen, Walinder, Hambert & Lundstrom, 1998;
Walinder, Lundstrom & Thuwe, 1978).
Despite the emergence of advanced medical interventions and treatments and visibility
for trans and gender nonconforming people, many people in the medical establishment still
incorrectly conflated gender identity with sexual orientation and there was substantial resistance
and disagreement with gender affirming surgeries and treatment (Hertoft & Sorenson, 1978;
McHugh, 1992; Socarides, 1969). Because the transsexual model of classification was a
medical one, the supposition was that transsexualism was a form of mental illness. Medical
practitioners and psychiatrists viewed trans and gender nonconforming people as mentally ill,
confused or repressed homosexuals, having character or personality disorders, neurotic,
psychotic, perverted and/or masochistic (Baastrup, 1966; Blumer, 1969; Ostow, 1953;
Siomopoulos, 1974; Socarides, 1969; Spensley & Barter, 1971; Weidman, 1953). Opponents of
SRS argued that the way to treat mental illness was through the brain, and that compliance with
patients’ requests for SRS was feeding into mental illness manifested through sexual perversion
(Wiedeman, 1953). Proponents of gender affirming hormones and treatments argued that SRS
was the only viable treatment for “true” transsexuals and that SRS should be considered a viable
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treatment option, but only in the most serious of cases. Benjamin wrote, “my principle argument
was that we doctors should be as conservative as possible in advising sex-reassignment surgery
or in performing such an irrevocable operation” (Benjamin, 1969, p. 6).
The gender clinics that opened all closed by 1979 due to backlash from the medical
establishment, most notably in the form of a paper that was given by Jon Meyer, the director of
the John Hopkins Gender Identity Clinic that claimed no improvement in male to female
transsexuals that had undergone SRS (Meyer & Reter, 1979). Meyer’s study has been critiqued
as being methodolically unsound, and a case has been made for scientific fraud (Blanchard &
Sherridan, 1990; Fleming et al., 1980; Ogas, 1994; Oppenheim, 1979), but the report made
national headlines, and the damage was done. Of the 40 gender clinics that had opened across
the United States, only three survived, two of which became private, and one which no longer
offered surgical treatment (Denny, 2002). “For more then a decade it was accepted without
question from the general public and by most professionals- including many in the field- that sex
reassignment had been definitively shown to be ineffective” (Denny, 2002, p. 39).
Harry Benjamin went on to form the Harry Benjamin Gender Dysphoria Association
(renamed the World Professional Organization for Transgender Health or WPATH) and
distributed his Standards of Care (SOC), a strict set of guidelines for the medical treatment of
trans individuals which include the ongoing involvement of medical and mental health
professionals as gatekeepers holding access to gender affirming treatments, and a “real life test”
where individuals seeking gender affirming treatments are required to live and work in their new
gender 24 hours a day 7 days a week for one year prior to treatment. The SOC are still in use
and undergo periodic revisions. In the latest version, updated in 2001, the real life test is now
called “real life experience” and one letter from a mental health professional is required for
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hormones, and two letters from professionals are required for surgery (WPATH, 2001). The
inherent problems of the SOC will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
The medical model of trans identities was hugely responsible for legitimizing trans
experience and made available gender affirming treatments to many trans people by turning what
was once thought of as a moral problem into a medical one. This of course did not come without
a price. The medical of model of trans identities was predicated on a binary system of genders
subject to intense scrutiny and classification. SRS changed males into females and females into
males, with no room for gender diversity and expression. People who were accepted into the
gender clinics were required to dress and behave in the extremes of masculine and feminine
behavior (Bolin, 1988; Denny, 1992). Those who fell outside of this were labeled “non
transsexual” and were denied treatment. Emphasis was placed on one’s ability to pass as a
member of the opposite gender and on sexual attractiveness.
A clinician during a panel session on transsexualism said he was more convinced of the
femaleness of a male-to-female transsexual if she was particularly beautiful and was
capable of evoking in him those feelings that beautiful women generally do. Another
clinician told us that he uses his own sexual interest as a criterion for deciding whether a
transsexual is really the gender she/he claims. (Kessler & McKenna, 1978, p. 113)
Not only is there an extreme abuse of cognitive authority present in this statement, but a
continued emphasis on binary gender roles and heteronormativity. Individuals were often
rejected on the basis of sexuality, age, marital status, job status and appearance in their new
gender role (Denny, 1992). For the hundreds of individuals who were able to get treatment from
the gender clinics, just as many were rejected due to binary and heterosexist beliefs. In a system
that punished its clients for truth telling, many people in the community began to tell stories that
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were consistent with the expectations of caregivers, and exemplified the text book trans
narrative.
The preoperative individual recognizes the importance of fulfilling caretaker expectations
in order to receive a favorable recommendation for surgery, and this may be the single
most important factor responsible for the prevalent mental-health conceptions of
transsexualism. Transsexuals feel that they cannot reveal information at odds with
caretaker expectations without suffering adverse consequences. They freely admitted to
lying to their caretakers about sexual orientation and other issues. Although caretakers
are often aware that transsexuals will present information carefully manipulated to
receive surgery . . . they only have to scrutinize several of their most prominent
diagnostic markers available in the literature to realize the reason for the deceit. If
caretakers would divorce themselves from these widely held beliefs, they would probably
receive more honest information. (Bolin, 1988, p. 63)
The binary gender belief and heterosexism of the gender clinics worked to silence the experience
of a vast majority of trans and gender nonconforming people. Cognitive authority denied
treatment to these individuals, marginalizing voices and experiences and forcing individuals into
a medicalized transsexual narrative in order to receive gender-affirming treatments.
The medical community has continued this trend of medicalizing gender identity by
coining the terms gender dysphoria and GID. The first two publications of the DSM, the DSM-I
(APA, 1952) and the DSM-II (APA, 1968) did not include any diagnosis for gender identity.
Instead diagnoses under the sexual deviations section, such as homosexuality and transvestism,
were often used in place. In 1980 ,in the DSM-III, transsexualism and gender identity disorder
of childhood (GIDC) was introduced into the manual as diagnosis for gender dysphoria in adults

69

and children (APA, 1980). In the DSM-III R, gender identity of adulthood and adolescence,
non-transsexual type was added (APA, 1987). In the DSM-IV, diagnoses for gender dysphoria
were collapsed into one diagnosis gender identity disorder (GID) with different criteria for
children and adults (APA, 1994, 2000). The term transsexual was replaced with GID, but the
DSM-IV still bases the diagnosis on distinguishing the various types of trans identities and
gender variance to determine eligibility for diagnosis and treatment recommendations (APA,
2000). In diagnosing and defining GID the DSM-IV-TR states:
There are two components of Gender Identity Disorder, both of which must be present to
make the diagnosis. There must be evidence of strong and persistent cross-gender
identification, which is the desire to be, or insistence that one is, of the other sex . . . To
make the diagnosis, there must be evidence of clinically significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. (APA, 2000,
p. 576)
The DSM-IV also includes a diagnosis of Transvestic Fetishism, for people who are designated
male at birth and cross dress for “erotic” purposes. A description of autogynephilia is also
present in the diagnosis, whereby “sexual arousal is produced by the accompanying thought or
image of the person as female” (APA, 2000, p. 574). No such category exists for people who are
designated female at birth who cross dress or are aroused by thoughts of themselves as males.
This points to misogyny through the pathologization of femininity and female bodies. In other
words, it is abnormal for a natal male to wear dresses and be aroused by thoughts of themselves
with female genitalia, but perfectly understandable for a woman to be aroused by the thought of
herself with a penis. It seems that due to the number of sex shops selling strap on dildos to
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people who are designated female at birth, this would be of interest to psychiatry, but again, a
heterosexist patriarchy would never pathologize the desire for a penis.
One of the major problems with the diagnosis of GID in relationship to the medical
model of transsexualism is that there are only a small number of people who actually fit the
diagnostic criteria of GID. Many trans women are perfectly content with their genitalia and do
not desire SRS. Many trans people do not come to a full understanding of themselves until much
later in life and therefore do not fit the typical trans narrative that insists one must have always
felt uncomfortable in the gender that matched their designated sex at birth. Many trans people
have diverse gender presentations, trans women can be butch and trans men can be feminine, and
a trans identity does not always make the binary distinction of masculine and feminine. Many
trans people are happy, healthy and functioning in their lives, prior to and after receiving genderaffirming treatments. Many trans and/or gender nonconforming people have no desire for
surgery or hormones. Trans people have a diverse and complicated sexuality, much in the same
way that all other groups of people do. Trans women may be lesbians and trans men may be
gay. Not all trans men were lesbians before coming out as trans.
It has largely been acknowledged by postmodern theory that gender is a social construct
that lies on a continuum (Bornstein, 1994; Butler, 1990; Freud, 1996). GID does not allow for
diversity of experience of trans and/or gender nonconforming people because GID reinforces,
“stereotypical sexist and heterosexist assumptions regarding normative male and female
experience, and serves to reify a traditional gender based hegemony” (Lev, 2005, p. 43). Many
trans people are gender queer or bi gendered and do not identify within the binary system of man
or woman.
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The medical approach to our gender identities forces us to rigidly conform ourselves to
medical providers’ opinions about what “real masculinity” and “real femininity” mean,
and to produce narratives of struggle around those identities that mirror the diagnostic
criteria of GID. (Spade, 2003, p. 28)
GID is the medicalization and pathology of gender identity and limits the expressions of self and
narratives of experience thereby imposing society’s patriarchal and heterosexual norms and
values onto trans people’s bodies and lives.
A diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder (GID) in the DSM, allows for the
pathologization and policing of difference in the medical and mental health fields through
cognitive authority. This diagnosis gives therapists and other health care providers the power to
decide who is and is not “truly transsexual” and who is and is not eligible and ready in the eyes
of the medical-industrial complex to receive gender-affirming treatments. Medical and mental
health professionals thereby, “decide as a society who is normal and what should be done with
people who deviate from society’s expectations-counseling being only one of the more benign
choices” (Freud, 1996, p. 334). Since a diagnosis of GID in the DSM suggests that there is a
disordered way to express gender, implied by the very name of the diagnosis, then there must be
a normative, non-disordered way to express gender and that, “all other gender expressions can be
compared to that and found not only deficient, but diagnosable as mentally ill” (Lev, 2005, p.
47).
The legacy of Harry Benjamin, the SOC, and the medical model of trans identities have
cemented the requirements for qualification as a “true transsexual”. The Standards of Care for
Gender Identity Disorder, (SOC) was written by the World Professional Organization for
Transgender Health (WPATH) and has stated that its purpose as follows:
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To provide flexible direction for the treatment of persons with gender identity disorder
. . . The SOC provide recommendations for eligibility requirements for hormones and
surgery. Without first meeting these recommended eligibility requirements the patient
and the therapist should not request hormones or surgery. (SOC, 2001, p. 1&7)
These “recommended requirements” are used by most mental health providers to enforce the role
of “gatekeeper” between client and provider and access to services. This document outlines the
way in which therapists can “assess” whether or not they believe a client in the statement of their
own identities while policing and controlling what people can and cannot do with their bodies.
The SOC and access to gender affirming treatments are contingent on a diagnosis of GID.
GID as a diagnosis implies that there are no healthy and functional trans people “who are
able to seek medical and surgical treatments for their own actualization without being labeled
mentally ill” (Lev, 2005, p. 42). One of the criteria for a diagnosis of GID is that “the
disturbances cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning” (APA, 2000, p. 581). It seems then, that one must be sufficiently
impaired in their life and functioning, completely unable to live their lives or go on another day
unless they receive gender-affirming treatments. While this may be true for some people who
experience real emotional distress as a result of their gender identity, this is certainly not the
experience of all. In fact, many people in the community like being trans and often the distress
and impairment that people feel is a symptom of society and its attempts to force identities into
socially constructed binaries. It is distressing to be oppressed everyday for the expression of
self, it is distressing to be denied health care, jobs and housing, assistance, parental and marriage
rights due to one’s gender identity. This is not the fault of the individual but the fault of an
oppressive society and culture that enforces a systemic model of oppression onto the lives of
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trans people. Trans people are not impaired in their functioning, but society clearly is. Building
a therapeutic framework based on this activist/allyship model is one of the ways providers can
begin to build socially just, competent and respectful practices with trans people.
The diagnosis and criteria for GID remove the power of the person to self identify,
undermining the entire framework of the therapeutic relationship. It is not enough to simply
identify ones own gender or gender identity; it must be proven with the help of a licensed
medical professional. Only then with the help of this “gatekeeper” may a person receive a letter
acknowledging the “truth” in a person’s self identified gender. This letter is often the only way
people can access gender affirming treatments, as most surgeons and endocrinologists make this
letter a requirement for services. Utilization of the diagnosis of GID and the writing of letters has
caused a widespread mistrust of therapists and their role of gatekeepers by the trans community.
It remains a double bind for many trans people who “need” these letters in order to access
gender-affirming treatments and seek therapy for this purpose alone. The problems inherent in
each of these “recommended requirements” of the SOC are many, and beyond the scope of this
paper. It is a tool that is used for the “protection” of providers, doctors, therapists, and surgeons.
What is implied here is that trans and gender nonconforming people are not reliable or
trustworthy, nor should they be believed in what they say, or in the statement of their own
identities. Only professionals with cognitive authority are capable of deciding who is a “true
transsexual” or “trans enough” to receive treatment.
Some people believe that a diagnosis of GID is necessary in the DSM because it
facilitates insurance coverage and disability protections. It is believed that having a diagnosed
condition that must receive necessary care will allow people to utilize healthcare to access
gender affirming treatments. Proponents of GID argue that removing the diagnosis from the
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DSM would make surgery and treatment a class issue, accessible only to the rich who are able to
pay out of pocket (Gorton, 2005). It seems as though transition is already a class issue,
complicated by not only the cost of surgery, but of psychiatric evaluation and documentation. A
medical model of trans identity heavily disfavors low-income trans people because they do not
have the economic means to access a diagnosis of GID, letters for gender affirming treatments,
or for the cost of hormones and surgeries themselves (Lee, 2008; Spade, 2003). The problem of
economic access to sophisticated health care is dramatically affected by the fact that trans
people, due to widespread institutional and systemic discrimination in education, employment,
and housing, are disproportionately more likely to live in poverty (Grant, Mottet, & Tanis, 2011).
This is especially troubling because access to many legal rights is often conditional upon the
medicalization of trans identities and cognitive authority. For instance, if someone is unable to
afford surgery (or doesn’t want surgery), then they are not legally allowed to change their gender
on their birth certificate, and in some states are prohibited from marrying their same sex partners
without a gender change in legal documents.
Access to surgery is seldom covered by insurance and transition is a costly endeavor. In
the last five years a small number of private insurance companies have begun to adopt policies
that allow coverage for gender affirming treatments; for the majority of people, however, access
to surgery is seldom covered by insurance due to policy exclusions (Gehi & Arkles, 2007;
Gorton, 2007). To date the cost of gender affirming treatments has been largely borne by the
individual utilizing these services (Gorton, 2007). There has been success in the legal arena
where lawsuits have successfully won suits against state Medicaid programs requesting payment
for gender related surgery and successful suits against prison officials requesting access to
hormone therapy while incarcerated (Lee, 2008). However, this makes trans and gender
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nonconforming people dependent on time consuming and extensive legal proceedings and
dependant on finding appropriate and affordable legal counsel, making this an ineffective and
burdensome way to access treatments.
No state includes Medicaid health coverage specifically for transition related health care,
and 24 explicitly exclude coverage for transition related care (Gehi & Arkles, 2007). For the
remaining states that do not have specific exclusions, “Transition related care may still be denied
based on interpretation and application of a more general exclusion such as for so-called
experimental or cosmetic treatments (Gehi & Arkles, 2007, p. 9). These exclusions specifically
reproduce hierarchies of race and class, as those who cannot afford gender-affirming treatments
or the cost of the few private insurance companies who do support transition related costs are
dependent on state insurance. Despite the adoption of a medical model and medical evidence
that supports the necessity of transition related care, trans and gender nonconforming people are
refused transition related treatment showing “the contradiction between the medicalization of
trans experience(s) and government’s refusal to recognize the legitimacy and necessity of trans
health care” (Gehi & Arkles, 2007, p. 7). A diagnosis is desirable for service providers in order
to act as protection from being sued while also providing insurance companies with the power to
exclude trans people from gender affirming treatments.
Gender variance is a natural and normal part of human diversity that has existed
throughout society and history (Feinberg, 1996). Pathologizing human diversity has long been a
tool used to force white capitalist patriarchal ideas of normality onto society as means of social
control. Currently the DSM is in its fifth revision process and GID is one of the most highly
contested diagnoses (Ehrbar, Winters, & Gorton, 2009). It is unlikely that GID will be removed
from the DSM, but instead it well be reformed, much in the same way that homosexuality was
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reformed in 1973. Despite the medical model of trans identities and treatment, trans people are
still unfairly excluded from treatment, stuck in a system that disadvantages low income people,
while still being held to the medical model’s cognitive authority and power of trans related
treatment through a diagnosis of GID and the SOC.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DISABILITY THEORY AND QUEER THEORY

Queer theory and disability theory have recently emerged as prominent academic
disciplines that problematize the construction of binaries and pathology of queer and disabled
people. This chapter will begin by giving a brief overview of these two theories and then attempt
to bridge these two disciplines as they effectively challenge both compulsory ablebodiness and
heterosexuality. Finally, queer theory and disability theory will be applied to the coconstruction, treatment and pathology of queer and disabled people within the medical-industrial
complex.
Queer Theory
As previously stated in this thesis, queer is a contentious term, with roots in
psychoanalysis, feminism, sexology, lesbian and gay studies, HIV/AIDS activism,
postmodernism and post structuralism. Queer as used in identity politics signals resistance to
oppression based on gender and sexuality and is rooted in the reclamation of the word from a
slur commonly leveraged against gay men. Queer “derives its force precisely through the
repeated invocation by which it has become linked to accusation, pathologization, insult”
(Butler, 1993, p. 226). Queer can refer to gays and lesbians, to the LGBT community in general
but has a more complex meaning as well. Giffney (2009) says,
Queer is more often embraced to point to fluidity in identity, recognizing identity as
historically-contingent and socially constructed fiction that prescribes and proscribes
against certain feelings and actions. It signifies the messiness of identity, the fact that
desire and thus desiring subjects cannot be placed into discrete identity categories, which
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remain static for the duration of people’s lives. Queer thus denotes a resistance to
identity or easy categorization, marking a disidentification from the rigidity with which
identity categories continue to be enforced and from beliefs that such categories are
immovable . . . it functions to designate a political persuasion, which aggressively
challenges hegemonies, exclusions, norms and assumptions . . . When signaling an
unapologetic, anti-assimilationist stance, queer champions those who refuse to be defined
in the terms of, and by the (moral) codes of behavior and identification set down by the
dominant society. (p. 2-3)
Queer is often understood as a fluid definition, often based in opposition to “normalcy” and in
resistance to presupposed categories. It is not a static thing, and is ever evolving. Queer is often
summed up in statements like, “queerness can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb
one” (Edelman, 2004, p. 17). Similarly, Halperin (1995) states:
Queer does not name some natural kind or refer to some determinate object; it acquires
its meaning from its oppositional relation to the norm. Queer is by definition whatever is
at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant. There is nothing particular to
which it necessarily refers. (p. 62)
As one can see, not everyone is queer in the same way, and as described above, queer can move
outside the realm of sexuality and encompass other aspects self and politics, not only gender, but
questions what is perceived as “normal”, “natural”, or essential to human beings and culture.
Queer can then be described as an identity category, an anti identity or anti assimilationist
position, a politic, or an academic discipline.
Having its roots in the word queer, queer theory, as a discipline is no easier to define or
describe then the word queer itself. Some theorists argue “there is not ‘queer theory’ in the
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singular, only many different voices and sometimes overlapping, sometimes divergent
perspectives that can loosely be called ‘queer theories’” (Hall, 2003, p. 5). This is also
exemplified by Berlant & Warner (1995) who argue:
It is not useful to consider queer theory a thing, especially one dignified by capital letters.
We wonder whether queer commentary might not more accurately describe the things
linked by rubric, most of which are not theory . . . It cannot be assimilated to a single
discourse, let alone a propositional program. (p. 343)
Queer theory then, is not a unified body of work, but rather, a set of theories and ideas that utilize
queer for its purposes. Queer theory is purposely slippery in that it functions as a “mode of
questioning while simultaneously interrogating the structural formation of such questions, at the
same time as being self-reflexive about the process of interrogative thinking” (Giffney, 2009, p.
1). Queer theory encourages us to engage, to ask questions while searching for meaning, and
takes very seriously the meaning of words and the power of language. Queer theory has
converged with just about every other academic discipline imaginable, for its usefulness in
questioning power and norms. Feminist theory, LGBT studies, postcolonial theory,
psychoanalysis, disability, Marxism, post structuralism, critical race studies, and religion all find
intersections with queer theory (Bell & Valentine, 1995; Boyarin, Itzkovits & Pellegrini, 2004;
Hawley, 2001; Johnsons & Henderson, 2005; Kassoff, 2004; Namaste, 2000; McRuer, 2006) For
the purposes of this thesis, then, queer theory, in all of its forms, remains a useful way of
thinking about, questioning, unpacking and unraveling the complexities of identity, oppression
and power, and its relationship to the medical-industrial complex, queer diagnoses and disability.
Queer theory emerged out of a critique of feminist theory and gay and lesbian studies.
Queer theorists understood these disciplines as working within structures that are limiting,
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hierarchical and exclusionary and therefore preventative to transformative change (Callis, 2009;
Minton, 1997; Seidman, 1994). Queer theory is based in the deconstruction of social norms and
institutions and aims to denormalize stable, binary identity categories. It has pointed to some of
the current limitations in identity categorization with particular emphasis on how not only the
dominant majority, but LGBTQ people themselves often lock into ideas and understandings of
self and identity which in turn can prohibit self expression and understanding and cause potential
difficulties in connection across identities.
Queer theorists understand that identities are always multiple, or at best composites, with
an infinite number of ways in which ‘identity components’ (e.g. sexual orientation, race
class, nationality, gender, age, ableness) can intersect or combine . . . Identity
constructions functions, if you will, as templates defining selves and behaviors and
therefore as excluding a range of possible ways to frame one’s self, body, desires, actions
and social relations. (Seidman, 1994, p. 173)
In this way, queer theory challenges the way identity categories have been used and framed in
Western identity politics, psychiatry, psychology, and the medical-industrial complex. In
particular, the use of the words homosexual and heterosexual can be traced to the ways in which
psychiatry and the medical profession sought to categorize people’s behavior and understand
these behaviors in terms of a specific natural identity. The normalization of homosexuality is
viewed as an enforcer of the truth of an individual’s sexual self and being that enforces moral
boundaries and hierarchies. It is premised on notions of resistance, that are decentered from
mainstream norms, and not contingent upon inclusion, but rather restructuring hierarchies by
looking and critiquing the ways in which these identity categories have been formed and
maintained. Queer is intersectional and political:
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Every person who comes to a queer self-understanding knows in one way or another that
her stigmatization is intricated with gender, with the family, with notions of individual
freedom, the state, public speech, consumption and desire, nature and culture, maturation,
reproductive politics, racial and national fantasy, class identity, truth and trust,
censorship, intimate life and social display, terror and violence, health care, and deep
cultural norms about the bearing of the body. Being queer means fighting about these
issues all the time, locally and piecemeal but always with consequences. It means being
able, more or less articulately, to challenge the common understanding of what gender
difference means, or what the state is for, or what "health" entails, or what would define
fairness, or what a good relation to the planet's environment would be. Queers do a kind
of practical social reflection just in finding ways of being queer. (Warner, 1991, p. 6)
Queer theory becomes relevant to all people in that it problematizes the sex/gender binary
system, and provides the opportunity to resist all forms of normativity, including patriarchy,
racism, classism, and ableism.
In its most basic form, queer theory attempts to deconstruct heteronormative sexualities
and practices, as well as to deconstruct gender and sexuality. In doing so, rather then studying
individuals, that is homosexuals or heterosexuals, queer theory looks at the intricacies of power
and language that claim that defining people based on sexual and gender categorizations is
normal and natural. That is to say, queer theory focuses on gender and sexuality as constructions
largely contingent on culture, time, place and history. In a sense, the stability of categories such
as heterosexual, lesbian and gay, become constructed on the basis of the historical and cultural
position of the individual, reliant in many ways on a gendered identity (Watson, 2005). The
binary social constructions of heterosexuality and homosexuality are relevant only to certain
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historical moments and times, and therefore, are not innate types of sexuality (Seidman, 1994).
Michael Foucault (1980) proposed this idea and for many his work provides the framework for
queer theory:
As defined by ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of forbidden acts;
their perpetrator was nothing more then the juridical subject of them. The nineteenth
century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, a life form . . . Nothing
that went into the total composition was unaffected by his sexuality. It was everywhere
present in him: at the root of all his actions . . . because it was a secret that always gave
itself away. (p. 43)
Foucault’s classic statement shows the ways in which subjects, in this case homosexuals, are not
natural facts, but are produced by social factors which then propel people into building
community and politics (Epstein, 1987; Seidman, 1994). Foucault believes that experiences such
as madness, sexuality, illness and crime have become the objects of institutional knowledge
inherent in psychiatry, and the penal and medical system. These identities became inherent to
individuals, and science and medicine ascribe these individuals with characteristics and traits
instead of acts and behaviors, subjecting these individuals to disciplinary power. In this way
Foucault ideas describe how identity is historically and culturally created, rather then inherent
and natural to particular identities. Many queer theorists, such as Alexander & Yescavage
(2009), have expanded upon Foucault’s understanding of the cultural and historical context of
identities,
Our interests in engaging in certain erotic behaviors became signs of who we actually are
as people- signs of our identity. If you’re a man and want to have sex with men, you are
‘homosexual’. That is who you are, not just something you do. (p. 51)
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Earlier this thesis, explored the ways in which trans and gender nonconforming identities have
been established and created by the medical-industrial complex. Queer theory has highlighted
the ways in which the continued propagation of the heterosexual norm by the medical and mental
health fields has contributed to the marginalization and pathology of queer sexuality and identity
in favor of a normative (read heterosexual and gender conforming) notion of self inherent in
these narratives.
Judith Butler’s book, Gender Trouble, is considered one of the seminal texts of queer
theory (Butler, 1990). Relying heavily on Foucault, Butler asserts “those historical and
anthropological positions that understand gender as a relation among socially constituted
subjects in specifiable contexts” (Butler, 1990, p. 15). Gender then is fluid and changing in
response to different contexts and times. She is clear to state the ways in which the construction
of sex leads to the presumption of gender as well as the presumption of sexuality, and presumes
that these are all free and independent of one another, but that it is only through cultural
configurations that these connections seem “natural”. Butler (1990) goes further in her critique
of the social constructions of gender and states, “There is no gender identity behind the
expressions of gender; ... identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are
said to be its results” (p. 25). She sees gender as a performance, what is being done at a
particular time in relationship to culture, rather then just who you are. Through this lens,
normative gender categories, such as man and woman become destabilized as natural and
normal, and instead become sites for fluidity and deconstruction.
Foucault’s ideas about power are also important to queer theory. His work describes
power as relational, as opposed to something that is possessed. Power, Foucault claims, is not
owned or excised by the dominant majority, but is inherent in all relationships and interactions
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between individuals. Power is everywhere. This reconceptualization of power provides
individuals with the possibility of resistance through reinvisioning discourse. Queer theorists
have utilized Foucault’s notion of power by resisting and confronting homophobic discourse.
Judith Butler, who promoted subversive strategies for parodying the heterosexual norm, by
producing competing discourses, and by exposing the falsehood, that an original gender or
sexuality exists (Watson, 2005). Like Foucault, she calls for subversive action as a way to undo
these systems because after all, gender and other identities are not one’s “core”, but rather an
effect of one’s performance. Queer theory largely understands this view of gender and sexuality,
but can be applied to any aspect of identity that is confined by a binary and/or cultural and
historical system.
It is in these influential works of Judith Butler and Michael Foucault, as well as other
notable queer theorists such as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1990) and Teresa de Lauretis (1991)
that one can trace several hallmarks of queer theory.
1) A conceptualization of sexuality which sees sexual power embodied in different levels
of social life, expressed discursively and enforced through boundaries and binary divides;
2) The problematization of sexual and gender categories, and of identities in general.
Identities are always on uncertain ground, entailing displacements of identification and
knowing; 3) A rejection of civil rights strategies in favor of a politics of carnival,
transgression, and parody which leads to deconstruction, decentering, revisionist
readings, and an anti- assimilationist politics; 4) A willingness to interrogate areas which
normally would not be seen as the terrain of sexuality, and to conduct queer "readings" of
ostensibly heterosexual or nonsexualized texts. (Stein and Plummer, 1994, p. 182)
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Queer theory explores the shifting construction and contemporary meanings of sexuality based
on the idea that the binary division of the world into the sexual categories of
heterosexual/homosexual is historically and culturally constructed. Queer theory locates power
in this binary as a site that is fixed and contested, and theorizes how identities do or do not fit
into this scheme. Warner (1991) describes the prevalence of homophobia and heterosexism and
positions queer theory as a challenge to these norms,
Because the logic of the sexual order is so deeply embedded by now in an indescribably
wide range of social institutions, and is embedded in the most standard accounts of the
world, queer struggles aim not just at toleration or equal status but at challenging those
institutions and accounts. The dawning realization that themes of homophobia and
heterosexism may be read in almost any document of our culture means that we are only
beginning to have an idea of how widespread those institutions and accounts are. (p. 6)
One of the most exciting things about queer theory is just how queer it actually is. That
is to say, queer theory is constantly shifting and changing encompassing ideas, identities and
experiences that fall outside of gender and sexuality. Sedgwick (1993) describes queer theory as
in constant evolution shaped by intersectionality.
A lot of the most exciting recent work around “queer” spins the term outward along
dimensions that can’t be subsumed under gender and sexuality at all: the ways that race,
ethnicity, postcolonial nationality criss-cross with these and other [sic] identityconstructing, identity-fracturing discourses, for example. (p. 9)
These ideas are useful in the consideration of the ways in which queer identities are constructed,
pathologized and “treated” within the medical-industrial complex. That is to say, categories of
trans identities, as well as LGBTQ models of identity in psychology and psychiatry are

86

contingent upon a narrative based on dominant perceptions located in place and time. GID, as a
diagnosis, enforces these understandings of LGBTQ identity by naming, legitimizing and
creating moral codes, rules and sets of behavior that form trans and gender nonconforming
identities. These structures create the narratives of trans and gender nonconforming experience
that one must live by in order to receive a diagnosis of GID and receive gender-affirming
treatment. Participation in this system creates hierarchies of trans experience and isolates those
that fall outside of these narratives.
For those working in the medical and mental health field, Foucault’s notion of power is
acutely relevant. Consideration of GID, its relationship to the cognitive authority of the medical
and mental health fields, and the ways in which queer theory calls for a revisioning of these
relationships is crucial to this work. The use of the diagnosis, the assumed “need” for diagnosis,
and the constraints of the Standards of Care in relationship to narratives and lived experiences
recapitulate a hierarchical system of power. The ways in which providers and LGBTQ people
seeking services can resist and reinvision these powers will be discussed fully in the discussion
chapter of this thesis.
Disability Theory
Historical and contemporary representations of disability may allow one to learn much
about the social and cultural expectations of everyone, much in the same way critical analysis of
gender and sexuality has shaped discussions of sex and gender for non-queer people. Thinking
critically about the ways in which disability, like queerness, has been socially constructed points
to parallels in pathology of both groups and the ways in which the medical-industrial complex
has used disability as well as queerness in the creation of the “other”. Kudlick (2005) speaks to
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the effects of medicalization on marginalized groups as well as current liberatory practices that
resist definitions of normality in the following quote:
It was only after the Enlightenment and the subsequent development of medicine as a
respected field of social intervention that human characteristics such as minority race,
female or queer sexuality, and physical or mental handicap came to be perceived as
problems in need of professional management. This medicalization of society has
affected virtually every marginal group. However, it had a particularly large impact on
those deemed physically and mentally anomalous, who found themselves categorized,
institutionalized, and often made targets for sterilization justified by medical science . . .
Just like women, people of color, Jews and sexual minorities, many with disabilities have
come to equate breaking free of medical definitions as a form of liberation and a way to
contest historically contingent ideas of normality, even as they acknowledge that
medicine has also benefited their lives. (p. 559)
By setting up a model of normal body (i.e. straight, temporarily able bodied, white male) the
medical model is also responsible for constructing disability as queer, which is other, and outside
the norm of able bodied. Initially disability was seen as punishment for sin or as a moral
problem and disabled people were thought of as being in need of help, care or cure. Later came
Social Darwinism, which, was followed closely by the eugenics movement. As there were major
advancements in medicine, biology and science, and the medical model picked up all of the old
tenets of the deficit model, society began to view disabled people as “lacking” some vital
function that medicine could “fix”. This individual model of disability arose out of a medical
model which defined disability as an individual deficit requiring medical intervention to make
bodies and minds “normal” (Clare, 2001; Dewsbury et al., 2004). This individual model of
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disability is still widely used in the medical-industrial complex today and is present in much of
social work thinking and literature. The individual model of disability is norm based, and has
been blamed for categorizing and creating normal models of bodies and abilities. This has
resulted in increased stereotyping and discrimination, and prejudice against those whose bodies’
fall outside of these created bounds of normality.
In the twentieth century, critiques rooted in social construction, discredited the individual
model of disability and lead to the creation of the social model of disability which, “place the
cause and responsibility for the problems that affect disabled people squarely on society itself,
rather than on the individual, and take the position that the needed changes must occur in the
society, not in the individual” (Rothman, 2003, p. 9). Modern disability theory has largely
embraced a social model of disability. Wendell (1996), proposes a model of disability as social
construction,
In my view, then, disability is socially constructed by factors such as social conditions
that cause or fail to prevent damage to peoples bodies; expectations of performance; the
physical and social organization of societies on the basis of young, non-disabled, ‘ideally
shaped’, healthy adult male paradigm, of citizens; the failure or unwillingness to create
ability among citizens who do not fit the paradigm; and cultural representations, failures
or representations, and expectations. (p. 45)
The social model of disability believes that it is not the impairments within the body that is the
problem, but society itself, and that impairments do not become “disabilities” until limitations
are presented in the form of access to basic human needs. (For example, not having use of one’s
legs and using a wheelchair is an impairment that becomes a disability when there are no access
ramps for entering and leaving a building). That which creates the disability is the environment,
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and society’s inability to accommodate the differences in a wide variety of basic human needs.
The problem then lies outside of the body and within society. For these reasons, this paper uses
the language, disabled person, rather than the language, a person with a disability, because of the
important distinction between impairment and disability within the social model.
While the social model of disability has been useful in “redefining disability in terms of a
disabling environment, repositioning disabled people as citizens with rights, and reconfiguring
the responsibilities for creating, sustaining and overcoming disablism” (Humphrey, 2000, p. 63)
the social model is not without its critiques. It has been argued that a social model of disability
fails to account for the lived and real experiences of bodily difference and experiences of chronic
pain (Clare, 2001; Rembis, 2010; Shakespeare, 2006). Critics argue that focusing on
environmental conditions does not fairly represent the experiences of gawking, chronic pain,
staring and body shame that many individuals experience. “There are disability thinkers who can
talk all day about the body as metaphor and symbol but never mention flesh and blood, bone and
tendon- never even acknowledge their own bodies” (Clare, 2001, p. 364). Additionally, many
feel that the social model does not account for the intersections of gender, race, ethnicity and
sexuality as they overlap with ableism (Ferri & Gregg, 1998; Mays, 2006).
Feminist theories of disability have done much to widen disability theory to include
gender, race, sexuality, ethnicity, and class. Through a critique of societally enforced gender
roles that equate masculinity with strength, health, and independence, feminist disability theorists
have highlighted the ways in which disability and disabled people are viewed as weak and
dependent, typically feminine characteristics, leading to troublesome assumptions about gender
and disabled people. They critique the ways in which society views disabled men as effeminate
and/or asexual based on their strength and health and place particular emphasis on the
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stereotypes and assumptions that disabled women experience due to gender roles and norms.
This is exemplified in the work of Eli Clare (1999),
To be female and disabled is to be seen as not quite a woman; to be male and disabled is
to be seen as not quite a man. The mannerisms that help define gender- the ways in
which people walk, swing their hips, gesture with their hands, move their mouths and
eyes as they talk, take up space with their bodies- are all based upon how nondisabled
people move. A woman who walks with crutches does not walk like a “woman”; a man
who uses a wheelchair and a ventilator does not move like a “man”. The construction of
gender depends not only upon the male and female body, but also upon the nondisabled
body. (p. 112)
Because some disabled bodies are unable to perform gendered behaviors in “passable” ways,
disabled people are often viewed as genderless, or less than male or female and thereby are often
also viewed as sexless (Sandhal, 2003).
Theorists have also pointed out the ways in which disabled women have been silenced,
and their rights to privacy, sex education, sexuality, birth control, reproductive health, the right
to bear children have been ignored or marginalized due to stereotypes and bias, and disabled
women are often subjected to sterilization, abortions and questions around their ability to care for
their children (Dotson, Stinson, & Christian, 2003; Ferri & Gregg, 1998; Garland-Thomson,
2002; Kallianes, & Rubenfeld, 1997; Mays, 2006; Sayce, & Perkins, 2002; Waxman-Fidduccia,
2000).
Through the social model of disability many feminist theorists, researchers and activists
have begun to deconstruct the dominant assumptions surrounding disabled sexuality and the
ways in which social, cultural and environmental barriers have long oppressed the expression of
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disabled people’s sexuality (Finger, 1992; Fine & Asch, 1988; Garland-Thomson, 1997; Hahn,
1988). Often issues of sex and sexuality for disabled people has focused on issues such as
divorce, abuse, sterilization and lack of privacy (Wilkerson, 2002). Disabled people have often
been portrayed as child-like and in need of protection, with little or no conversations on selfidentification of sexuality and/or pleasure (Tepper, 2000). The literature has moved from a
negative and discriminatory view of disabled people as not being acceptable candidates for
reproduction, or as even capable of having sex for pleasure, to a depiction of disabled people
celebrating, exploring and vocalizing their sexualities through first person narratives (Tepper,
2000; Wilkerson, 2002). The social model which gave way to the exploration and theorizing on
the sexuality of people with disabilities has its limits in that it focuses heavily on civil rights,
often overlooking issues of self love and self worth that are crucial to a healthy sexuality
(Shakespeare, 2000). Due to the social model’s roots in a male dominated activist culture and
research practice, gender normative sexualities are often assumed, presenting contradictions to
the very nature of disabled sexuality which oftentimes defies norms and expectations (Rembis,
2010). Rembis (2010) notes the importance of challenging these norms,
The future of (dis/abled) sexualities depends not on disabled men’s ability and
willingness to “challenge” dominant assumptions by admitting that they are more
“feminine” in their love making and that this can actually be “positive”. Nor does it
necessarily depend on disabled women who “defy” stereotypes by marrying and bearing
(or adopting) and raising children. (p. 56)
This way of thinking and advocating for disabled sexuality serves to reinforce the heterosexual
matrix. Instead, there is a push to challenge “normal” institutions such as marriage and
monogamy and the ways in which these systems exclude and marginalize a range of experiences
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and sexualities (Wilkerson, 2002). By challenging normative beliefs of sexuality (i.e., that men
are dominant, that sex is only penetrative, that sex can only be between two people) disability
theorists have pushed the focus on sex as vital and important to happiness (Shakespeare, 2000).
Additionally, it has been argued that sexual stereotyping has been used to oppress all
minority groups. Wilkerson (2002) believes that sexual agency should be a key political strategy
for all oppressed people:
Sexual democracy should be recognized as a key political struggle, not only because of
the importance of the basic human right to sexual autonomy, but also because a group’s
sexual status tends to reflect and reinforce its broader political and social status. I
understand sexual agency not merely as the capacity to choose, engage in, or refuse
sexual acts, but as a more profound good which is in many ways socially based,
involving not only the sense of oneself as a sexual being, but also a larger social
dimension in which others recognize and respect one’s identity . . . In my view, the
socially based aspects of sexual agency constitute a hierarchy in which those who are
most socially privileged on various axes of social difference (including sexual orientation
along with race, class, age, and gender expression among others) are, other factors being
equal, most likely to be considered respectable, and therefore worthy citizens. (p. 35)
Sexuality and sexual agency is a key political struggle in the liberation of all oppressed groups.
In many ways, aspects of queer theory have been used to deconstruct disabled sexuality, adding
another dimension to theory (Rembis, 2010; Schildrick, 2009; Shakespeare, 2000). Queer theory
is used in this discourse to expand the rigid sex and gender roles, as well as heteronormative
assumptions that are often placed on the sexuality of disabled people (Golfus, 1997; Tepper,
2000; Wilkerson, 2002). The result has been a deconstruction of binaries, an expansion of
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normative ideas around what does and does not constitute sex, and a challenge to past silences as
and imposed ideas around disabled sexuality (Kaufman, Silverberg, & Odette, 2003; Rembis,
2010).
The social model of disability, rooted in resistance to the medical and individual model of
disability is directly related to other disciplines rooted in social justice and activism. Monaghan
(1998) describes these connections,
The new, humanities-oriented approach to disability studies borrows from…cultural
studies, area studies, feminism, race-and-ethnic studies, and gay-and-lesbian studies. It is
extensively informed by literary and cultural criticism, particularly of the poststructuralist variety, insofar as it pulls apart concepts about disability to see what cultural
attitudes, antagonisms, and insecurities went into shaping them. (Monaghan, 1998, ¶ 13)
These connections provide an important base for an intersectional approach to disability within
other disciplines, and social justice movements.
The critique of the social model of disability has been summed up by Shakespeare and
Watson (2001) as, “a modernist theory of disability—seeking to provide an overarching metaanalysis covering all dimensions of every disabled person’s experience” that “is not a useful or
attainable concept” (p. 19). Backlash and critique of the social model has been quite common
and underscores the need for a revision of theory and thinking in disability scholarship. Gabel &
Peter (2004), argue for the need to “provide ways of theorizing disability more suited to current
contexts and more responsive to emerging world trends” (p. 586) and propose the use of
resistance theory to achieve this aim. It is argued that resistance is a natural progression of
disability theory since resistance is already a key component to the social model of disability in
that it was created in resistance to the medical model, and is based in resistance to oppression,
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stigmatization, economic and social marginalization, political exclusion, and ableism. One form
of resistance may be in the use of imagery in the media that challenges beliefs and stereotypes
around disability, it might take place in terms of a struggle, or through writing and art that these
aims are achieved. Gabel & Peter (2004) have a more nuanced and complicated understanding of
resistance:
Thinking of resistance in this way, as operating in all directions of the social sphere
across paradigmatic boundaries, helps one to understand the push and pull of the
conversation of resistance. Resistance functions as a way for disabled people to push
against dominance while also attempting to pull society into disabled people’s way of
seeing . . . Disabled people and their political partners are in critical de/re/constructive
conversations with those who actively or passively participate in disablement. Various
forms of resistance fold, unfold, and fold back into one another while variegated new
forms of social relations emerge. (Gabel & Peter, 2004, p. 594-595)
Resistance theory emphasizes the use of multiple voices containing a variety of experiences as a
way to enlarge the understanding of everyone and to overcome disagreements and move beyond
singular interests thereby incorporating “resistance within social movements as a tool for
transforming the target of their resistance- the larger society” (Gabel & Peter, 2004, p. 593).
Gabel (2005) sees resistance as mutually engaging, dialectic and capable of transformative
change:
In addition to interpreting resistance as engagement in dichotomous processes, resistance
theory also connotes an open-ended negotiation of meaning, a fluid dialectic movement
without the constraints of time or space. It addresses the critics of the strong social
model by opening up possibilities and blurring boundaries while it also avoids the
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theoretical tendency to construct abstract or rigid models from which action and social
change cannot emerge. (p. 8)
While the rejection of the medical model of disability is still prevalent in most disability
theory, there has been some reconceptualization, particularly within the context of resistance
theory, that incorporate the usefulness of the medical model in the lives of some disabled people.
This includes the benefits of some medications and technologies that improve functioning (Gabel
& Peters, 2004). Despite this, there is still caution against using the medical model in the social
context of disability because of the ways in which the medical-industrial complex may continue
to oppress disabled people if this happens. This may include the pathologizing of distress caused
by societal discrimination and treatment of internalized oppression with medications.
Additionally, adherence to the medical model may continue the stigmatization of people based
on medical and diagnostic categories and cures that border on cultural genocide in their attempts
to cure or fix disabilities, such as a cure for deafness which would erase deaf culture, or a cure
for dwarfism, thereby eliminating Little People (Gabel, 2005; Ricker, 1995; Tucker, 1998).
Like studies of race, class, gender and sexuality, disability studies give voice to those
who have been ignored by wealthy, educated, able bodied, white society and history, and
disability is now largely understood as a cultural construction, much in the same way race,
gender, sex and sexuality are (Jones, 1996; Rapley, 2004; Swain, French, & Cameron, 2003;
Wendell, 1996). Falling outside the norm, groups which have been historically othered challenge
cultural constructions of normality by pushing boundaries and exposing the false notion of a
mythic norm, white heterosexual able bodied and male, as the natural (Lourde, 1984). Postmodern and social constructionist theory have been crucial in turning the gaze from the “other”
onto the self, thereby pressing all people to rethink natural or normal concepts of sex, gender,
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race, sexuality, and the study of disability and disability theory calls into question assumptions
and norms for bodies, functioning and beauty (Terry & Urla, 1995). McRuer (2002) notes:
Contemporary cultures function according to models (of ability, productivity, efficiency,
flexibility) that privilege nondisabled (and docile) bodies and identities . . . and the
concomitant revaluation of a range of corporealities currently sustains vibrant activist and
intellectual communities concerned with the development of alternative disability
identities and cultures. (p. 224)
Disability studies, while shaping an identity and community for disabled people, has also
problematized the able-bodied and disabled binary, arguing that this system maintains power
over the privileged and dominant without accurately describing the reality of human experience.
These categories are false, in that every human has a diverse and complicated range of bodily
experiences. Disability activists and theorists have critiqued the medical model of disability and
provided a complex understanding of the ways in which able bodied stereotypes and ideas of
normalcy maintain systems of power and oppression.
Queering and Cripping
At the root of queer theory is the practice of queering, that is, to question what is normal
or normative, and to ask critical questions about who is being excluded and what is being
assumed. Queering, or to queer (when queer is used as a verb) is used as a way to upset the
norms and heteronormativity of society.
If the term queer is to be a site of collective contestations, the point of departure for a set
of historical reflections and futural imaginings, it will have to remain that which is, in the
present, never fully owned, but always and only redeployed, twisted, queered from a

97

prior usage in the direction of urgent and expanding political purposed. (Butler, 1993, p.
228)
In the quote above, Judith Butler asserts that queer can be used as method to engage in a process
that inquires, expands current knowledge and understanding. “Queerness constitutes not just a
resistance to social norms or a negation of established values but a positive and creative
construction of different ways of life” (Halperin, 1995, p. 81). Queering is a primary mode of
queer critique, a “critical perversion that continuously forges unexpected alliances and gives
voice to identities our heteronormative culture would like to, and cannot, silence” (McRuer,
1997, p. 5). Queering is political; it resists universalizing and continues to change in response to
social and cultural climates (Ramlow, 2009). The goal, as Michael Warner (1991) puts it, is "to
make theory queer, and not just to have a theory about queers" (p. 18). Queering has been used
across disciplines from the queering of literature, film and plays, to sports and science, religion
and ecology, sociology and geography, to marriage and politics. Queering, in this way, means to
question and complicate, to challenge and play, to propose and subvert, and to push continually
toward complexity.
Cripping emerged out of disability theory and activism as a mode of critiquing and
subverting the representations, practices and exclusionary effects of able bodied assumptions.
“Similar to the queering of queer, cripping reframes, reinterprets and resignifies multiple
representations of disability in the service of urgent and emerging social and political contexts”
(Ramlow, 2009, p. 136). Cripping, has its roots in queer theory. As McRuer (2006) notes:
In queer studies it is a well-established critical practice to remark on heterosexuality’s
supposed invisibility . . . an important body of feminist and antiracist work considers how
compulsory heterosexuality reinforces or naturalizes dominant ideologies of gender and
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race . . .Able-bodiness, even more than heterosexuality, still masquerades as a
nonidentity, as the natural order of things. (p. 1)
Cripping values deviance, highlights the ways in which disability is excluded,
stereotyped, and marginalized, and offers a place of resistance to these modes of normalcy.
Cripping is a method of inquiry that challenges normative ways of being and seeing calling into
question cultural assumptions around beauty, bodies, health and functionality.
Cripping allows the “capacity for recognizing and withstanding the vicissitudes of compulsory
ablebodiness” (McRuer, 2005, p. 591). McRuer (2006) sees cripping as directly related to queer
theory:
I argue that critical queerness and severe disability are about collectively transforming (in
ways that cannot necessarily be predicted in advance)- about cripping- the substantive,
material uses to which queer/disabled existence has been put by a system of compulsory
able-bodiness, about insisting that such a system is never as good as it gets, and about
imagining bodies and desires otherwise. (p. 32)
Queering and cripping act as tools of inquiry and critique to notice, question, reclaim and reform,
acting to recognize that “another world can exist in which an incredible variety of bodies and
minds are valued and identities are shaped, where crips and queers have effectively (because
repeatedly) displaced the able-bodied/disabled binary” (McRuer & Wilkerson, 2003, p. 14). As
is shown in the next section of this paper, queerness and disability in many ways are inextricably
linked and co-created in the service of compulsory heterosexuality and ablebodiness.
Queering Disability and Disabling Queers
Disability theory and queer theory share many similarities. Both arose out of civil rights
movements, and have deep commitments and roots in radical activism. Both queer and disabled
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communities have deep histories of oppression. Both have been demonized by religion,
discriminated against in employment, housing and education, and isolated socially. Queer and
disabled communities are vastly diverse in their memberships, with queer and/or disabled people
representing a vast array of class, race, gender, sexuality, religion, and political affiliation.
Notably, both queer and disability theories have ardent stances against concepts of normality,
whether through gender, sexuality, mental, bodily, social or cultural. That does not mean that
queer theory and disability are one and the same, or that one is a subset of the other, “Theory has
to understand that different identity environments, or alternatively of other new social
movements, often differ in important ways- even when they are intermingled in experience
(Warner, 1991, p. xxvii). As noted in the previous section of this paper, disability theory has
built upon the identity-based theories of queer theory in order to develop a theoretical base from
which to talk about disability. This thesis asserts that queer theory may find as much usefulness
in disability theory as disability theory has found in queer theory.
Of particular interest when considering the intersections of queer theory and disability
theory is the role that psychiatry and the medical and mental health fields have played in
oppressing both queer and disabled bodies and experiences. This has been done by pitting one
pathology against the other, by using disability to justify the exclusion and pathology of queer
people and by using queerness to other, exclude and pathologize disability (McRuer, 2006;
Sherry, 2004). Homosexuality and disability are both seen as pathological conditions, and
homosexuality is often seen as a kind of disability, while disabled people are often seen as
asexual or undesirable as sexual partners. This paper will now consider the ways in which
queerness has been constructed through disability and the ways in which disability has been
constructed as queer in the medical-industrial complex.
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Important to the understanding of the ways in which queerness has been used in the
construction of disability is the recognition that a lesbian or gay identity does not need to be
ascribed to disability in order to use queerness as pathology in disability. The ways in which
disability has been queered can be seen most notably in the pathology of bodily difference.
Physical difference in bodies has been ascribed as “freakish” as evidenced by the history of the
circus sideshow, as well as in the history of medical photography of not only disabled but also
intersexed bodies. Garland-Thomson (2001) writes extensively about the power dynamics and
structure that a culture of staring creates,
As anyone with a visible disability knows, being looked at is one of the universal social
experiences of being disabled . . . The dominant mode of looking at disability in this
culture is staring . . . staring is an intense form of being looking that enacts a spectator
and spectacle between two people . . . and manifests the power relations between subject
positions of ‘disabled’ and ‘able-bodied’ . . . Constituting the starer as normal, and the
object of the stare as different, it creates disability as a state of absolute difference, rather
then as one more variation in human form. (p. 346-347)
Indeed, all oppressed and marginalized people are in some ways constructed as “perverts” by
heteronormative culture, creating classes of people who are sexually deviant in opposition to
those who need protection from them. McRuer & Wilkerson (2003) describe this at length:
The drama of perverts, victims, and protectors is played out in countless arenas, from
honest (read: white-middle class) taxpayers cheated by sexually and reproductively outof-control welfare mothers (read: African American women) to innocent (read:
heterosexual) youth in need of protection from the corrupting influences of sexual,
especially queer, content (a notion of corruption also inflected with class issues) on the
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Internet. Thus social relations of race, class, age, and other modes of oppression that are
not always reducible to conflicts of gender and sexuality are nonetheless continually
played out in sexual terms- mediated by the bodily terms that disability activists and
scholars have recognized. (p. 8)
Here one can see the ways in which sexual representations and identities are co-constructed. In
many ways, the restriction and regulation of any sexual expression can be viewed as a form of
political and social repression. Much in the same way that many queer people are stereotyped as
sexual predators who may corrupt or turn innocent people into queers, physical difference and
disability have been queered by ascribing and inferring asexuality, vulnerability, infertility,
exoticism, and perversion to people with disabilities. People with cognitive disabilities have also
been queered through the ascription of uncontrollable sexuality that needs to be protected and/or
contained. This is done in an effort to justify the exclusion of queer and/or disabled people from
issues of access and basic rights, and to construct a medical model of “normalcy” in bodies.
“Deviant” sexualities are often used in the construction of the other, and as this paper has noted,
deviant sexuality has also been ascribed to disabled people as well.
Theorist McRuer has noted the ways in which compulsory able bodiness and compulsory
heterosexuality are interwoven in that these systems work together to continually remake the
able body and heterosexuality (McRuer, 2006). Indeed, heterosexuality is about health,
reproduction, strength, power and stamina. Queerness as sick and deviant therefore lies in a
contested body of weakness, unable to procreate. Health is directly related and reproduced in
compulsory heterosexuality, and compulsory able bodiness is abound with notions of straight
heterosexuality. They mythic norm, is not only white and straight then, but also able bodied.
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Baynton (2001), a disability theorist, has demonstrated through much of his writing the
ways in which disability has functioned historically to justify the inequality of other minority
groups. He asserts, “Not only has it been considered justifiable to treat disabled people
unequally, but the concept of disability has been used to justify discrimination of other groups by
attributing disability to them” (p. 33). He demonstrates the ways in which disability has been
applied to gender, race and immigration status as a way to question citizenship and desirability.
Given Baynton’s argument, it is a logical step to then consider the ways in which disability has
also been attributed to queerness as justification for pathology and exclusion. One only has to
look to the history of queer diagnoses to see the ways in which disability has been used in the
construction of queer. Historically, the medical model has labeled homosexuality as a
psychiatric disability and sexual deviance as pathology and neurosis. Homosexuality was not
removed from the DSM until 1973, and the argument can be made that the diagnosis has
remained throughout time, with just a change in name. Diagnoses of queerness and sexuality
still exist in the DSM, most notably in the pathology of trans identities within the diagnosis of
Gender Identity Disorder. The construction of queerness as a disability continues actively today;
it is not uncommon for there still to be language and discourse around “treatment” for LGBT
people and the search for (or discovery of) a “gay gene” or worse still, a “cure”. Additionally,
disabled people were often seen as “unanalyzable by the psychoanalytic community and a
history of pathologized narcissism has often been imposed on the identity politics of both
LGBTQ people and people with disabilities” (Siebers, 2008). The queering of disabled people as
justification for pathology and exclusion by the medical and mental health community shows the
ways in which heterosexual normativity is threatened, not only by sexuality and LGBTQ people,
but by the physical difference and disability as well.
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Following this rationale, it seems important to consider the implications of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), a federal law designed specifically to give equal access and
protections to people who were previously discriminated against and excluded based on ability.
The ADA applies to every aspect of employment including recruitment, hiring, promotion,
demotion, layoff and return from layoff, compensation, job assignments, job classifications, paid
or unpaid leave, fringe benefits, training, and employer-sponsored activities, including
recreational or social programs. The ADA, by providing people with federal legal protections,
was specifically designed to begin to transform the ways in which disability has been used as
justification for exclusion. Rothman (2003) describes the historical impact of the ADA:
The Americans with Disabilities Act . . . demonstrated a clear shift in theoretical position.
The ADA views disability as more of a social construction than as a moral failure and
placed on society the responsibility for ensuring that disabled people have access, rights,
and opportunities similar to those of nondisabled people. (p. 246)
Laws have a huge implication outside of just the legal realm and effect the creation of medical,
sexual, and physical norms (Frug, 1992). Through the work of community members, activists
and theorists in the disability community, the passage of the ADA is a direct example of laws
being used to shift sociocultural norms around health and normality.
Despite the fact that trans and/or gender nonconforming identities are contained within
the DSM, and are therefore considered by the APA as mental disorders, trans and gender
nonconforming people are specifically excluded from the American with Disabilities Act. In fact
the ADA specifically excludes “sexual behavior disorders” and “gender identity disorders” from
its definition of a protected disability (Americans with Disabilities Act, 1991). The ADA also
excludes homosexuality and bisexuality from coverage because they “are not impairments and as
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such are not disabilities” but contrarily also excludes disorders specifically named in the DSM
such as “transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity
disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders”
(Americans with Disabilities Act, 1991). Although the APA recognizes these specifically as
mental disorders by their inclusion in the DSM, the ADA specifically excludes them from the
federal law. All other DSM diagnoses are covered under the ADA. Why then specifically
exclude the queer diagnoses? This is a clear example of the ways in which queerness and
disability have not only been co-constructed, but also the ways in which disability and queerness
have been used against each other. The American Psychological Association insists that “queer
diagnoses” are indicative of disorders, therefore labeling queer people as impaired and disabled.
The APA uses disability as a way to exclude and marginalize queer people. The American with
Disabilities Act on the other hand, specifically uses queerness as justification for exclusion.
This is a clear example of the ways in which sexual behavior and transgressive gender
identity are used to reify the socially moral grid that underscores all law.
Rather then changing the ethical significance of all disabilities, the Act carves out a new
class of untouchables defined by sexuality and sex behaviors. Because the ADA is the
most extensive civil rights law to address bodily norms, the exclusion of sex-and genderrelated conditions has tremendous expressive importance. By leaving open a space of
permissive employer discrimination, the Act identifies the sexual ‘deviant’ as the new
pariah, using the legal machinery of the state to mark as outsiders those whose
noncompliant body renders them unfit for full integration into a working community . . .
By categorically repudiating persons whose sexual behavior transgresses social norms,
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the Act denies the sexually nonconforming legal protections that are guaranteed to all
citizens in a democratic state. (Hiegel, 1994, p. 2)
It has been noted in the literature that the specific exclusion of transsexuals, gender identity
disorder, and other queer diagnosis from the ADA was a result of a compromise to address the
concerns of conservative members of congress, notably Jessie Helms, who saw the ADA as
supporting or favoring individuals whose lifestyles they did not approve of, thereby making it
impossible to utilize religiously motivated reasons for non-hire (Hebert, 2009; Levi & Klein,
2006). While some may argue for the exclusion of gender related identities from the
classification of disability because they do not want to pathologize individual experience, this
was certainly not the motivation of Congress. Bias, bigotry, hatred and oppression of trans and
gender nonconforming people exists at the heart of this exclusion.
A number of different approaches have been used to gain legal protections against
discrimination in employment for trans and gender nonconforming individuals. Some argue that
gender non conformity is a medical condition to pursue protection under disability law, but this
has been unsuccessful at the federal level (due in large part to the ADA), and has had mixed
results on the state level (Levi & Klein, 2006; Herbert, 2009). Some jurisdictions provide
protections for trans and gender nonconforming people by including gender identity and/or
gender expression in their anti-discrimination statutes, in an attempt to protect trans and gender
nonconforming people as a class, but this has also been unsuccessful on a federal level and while
it has occurred in a number of states, it is still a significant minority of states (Herbert, 2009;
Levi & Klein, 2006).
Despite the fact that transition related health care is accepted by health care providers to
be medically necessary (Brown, 2001; Gordon, 1991; Meyer et al., 2001; Pfallin & Junge, 1998),
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no state has a regulation that explicitly provides Medicaid coverage for transition related
treatment (Gehi & Arkles, 2007). In fact 24 states explicitly exclude transition related
treatments, and for those that do not, whether procedures are or are not covered are frequently
determined through agency and court decisions (Gehi & Arkles, 2007). Gehi & Arkles (2007)
describe this situation as a double bind for trans and gender nonconforming people with huge
class and racial implications:
The courts often defer to medical evidence with regard to transgender people in a wide
variety of contexts but then often disregard or implausibly explain away the
overwhelming weight of medical evidence when considering the necessity of transgender
health care. The state often requires transgender people to have been evaluated and
treated by transgender health experts or to have received specific forms of transition
related health care before giving them access to gender-matched ID, appropriate sexsegregated systems, or remedies for discrimination. At the same time, the state often
denies access to transition related health care to Medicaid recipients and people in state
custody. This double bind assaults the dignity of transgender people and has a profound
impact on trans communities, with disproportionate effects on those who face other forms
of marginalization, such as racism and poverty. State systems that deny coverage for
transition related health care while requiring this care in other contexts thereby create a
hierarchy of race and class in which rich, predominately White trans people- because they
do not need to rely on the state for health care- are the only transgender individuals able
to gain access to a wide variety of basic services and opportunities on anything
approaching an equal basis with non-transgender people. (p. 23)
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All of this not only continues to point to the co-creation and construction of disability and
queerness and the justification for exclusion, but also further complicates the debates around
GID in the DSM.
Nowhere do the implications for the relevance of disability theory in the consideration of
LGBT people come to the surface more prominently then in the current and past debates around,
“queer diagnoses” in the medical and mental health community, specifically Gender Identity
Disorder (GID). The debate around GID has been quite active in recent years due to the
upcoming publication of the DSM-V and the creation of a working group to specifically examine
the diagnosis of GID and its criteria. Obviously, the biggest argument for the removal of GID in
the DSM is that many activists and/or members of the trans community object to the diagnosis
on the basis of it being a mental disorder. They argue that this continues to extend the cognitive
authority over trans bodies and experience and continues to reflect social and cultural
assumptions, stereotypes, maintain hierarchies and systems of power and oppression, deny the
complexities of trans experience, and remove the power of the person to self identify (Ault &
Brzuzy, 2009; Ehrbar, Winters & Gorton, 2009; Langer & Martin, 2004; Lev, 2005; Sennott,
2011; Serano, Ryan, & Winters, 2009).
Some of the discussion around GID argues for its usefulness in a legal setting and has
begun to acknowledge the benefits around the use of diagnosis and the medical model of
transsexuality as well as disability in legal proceedings in order to expand access, services, and
the rights of transgender people on a state level (Levasseur, 2009; Thaler, 2009). It has been
suggested that there need not be a DSM diagnosis for an individual to be covered by law,
because it is enough that trans and gender nonconforming people may be seen as having an
impairment acknowledged as a health condition to pursue protections (Levi & Klein, 2006).
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Others suggest that for vulnerable populations, such as those who are confined to the prison
industrial complex, pursuit of gender affirming treatments through a medical model is absolutely
necessary, justified and compelled by the specific context of prison (Lee, 2008). It is argued,
that the removal of the medical model would make it much more difficult for people to gain
access to services since prisons would not support gender affirming treatments such as
hormones. Gorton (2005) argues:
Loss of the DSM diagnostic category for GID will endanger the access to care,
psychological well being, and in some cases, the very life of countless disenfranchised
transgender people who are dependent on the medical and psychiatric justification for
access to care. (p. 9)
Other people within the transgender community such as those dependent on shelters, group
homes and other sex segregated facilities, as well as those who utilize public health care systems,
will also be negatively affected if they are unable to pursue protections through a medical model
of transsexuality. For those individuals who are the most vulnerable in the trans and gender
nonconforming community (i.e. trans people in prisons, poor trans people and trans people of
color) legal suits against medical and insurance systems are lengthy, inaccessible, problematic
and increasingly stigmatizing. One needs access to gender affirming and socially just legal
professionals, something that is usually only found in major metropolitan areas, and that
dependence on court trials and cases is a tenuous way to secure services.
Gorton (2005), argues that the call for the removal of GID in order to de-stigmatize trans
and gender nonconforming people undermines the fight to destigmatize all mental illness,
therefore pitting marginalized groups against one another. Shannon Sennott (2011) posits that
Gorton’s view is an essentialist argument that “would only be feasible if the DSM contained a
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diagnosis for all variations of gender identity, including those that conform to the socially
enforced gender/sex/sexuality categories” (p.29). Sennott (2011) states:
Focus on the de-stigmatization of all mental illness instead of fighting for the removal of
GID runs the risk of essentializing the argument to a point where the movement to end
gender oppression is so diluted it can no longer be legitimately connected to its feminist
tradition and roots . . . The arguments that call for the removal of GID from the DSM
based on de-stigmatization are founded on the feminist principles that in a socially-just
world, gender of any kind will not be pathologized. (p. 99)
Other arguments suggest that a continued pursuit of legal protections through disability law may
be the best way to secure state level protections for trans and gender nonconforming people
(Levi & Klein, 2006). While rejection of trans and gender non-conformity as a disability in
many ways may be the result of negative attitudes and feelings towards people with disabilities
in the trans and gender nonconforming community, the biggest argument still is in protest to GID
as a mental illness, rather than a disability. This question circles back to the ADA itself and the
specific exclusion of trans and gender nonconforming people from federal legal protections.
Whether trans and/or gender nonconforming people protest the pursuit of legal protections under
disability law, or disability activists hedged to allow the exclusion of trans and gender
nonconforming people in the ADA due to right wing pressure does much to demonstrate,
Not only the contradictory nature of identity, but also the ways in which the division of
‘us’ and ‘them’, in all of its manifestations is institutionalized. Contemporary systems of
power are structured to shore up –or immunize- dominant fictions of identity and to
secure thereby the privileges that accrue to those not stigmatized by queerness, deviance,
or pathology. (McRuer, 2002, p. 223)
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That is to say, the institutionalization of power has positioned itself in such a way to secure the
compulsory heterosexuality and compulsory able bodiness as positions that are linked and bound
together granting privileges to those that fall within its normalized boundaries.
Members of marginalized communities in effect identify an even more marginalized
group in order to resist the stigma imposed by a dominant culture: gay men and lesbians
insist that homosexuality is not “really” a mental disorder, feminists insist that female
bodies are not “really” biologically inferior, as so forth . . . disability of some sort is
invariably identified as the “real” aberrancy . . . methodological distancing takes place
within disability communities as well, most obviously as people with physical disabilities
distance themselves from those with cognitive disabilities. I would extend the
complication further, however, suggesting that queerness or ‘perversion’ also function,
within processes of methodological distancing as the ‘real’ aberrancy. People with
physical and mental disabilities who are perceived as a bit queer can demonstrate that
such a difference is texturally produced by distancing themselves from the ‘real’
queerness or perversion (embodied by those who are not straight). (McRuer, 2002, p.
225)
While disability theory has used queer theory to critically think about the heteronormative
assumptions of disabled experience, and has used the basic tenets of queer theory to question
binaries and expand theory, queer theorists have not followed suit. What is lacking from this
discourse between queer and disability theory is a critical analysis of the important implications
that current disability theory can have for queer people, as well as the ableist assumptions of
most discussions around queer identity, politics and theory. Since the construction of queer in
the medical and mental health community has always been done within a framework of disability
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it seems logical that these connections would be explored. That queer theory has not attempted
to see the connections and relevance of contemporary disability theory on the lives, experiences
and rights of LGBT people, despite the obvious connections between the two, points to a fear of
aligning queer people with disabled people. Is this neglect the result of ableism? Similarly,
despite the obvious construction of queerness as a disability, trans and gender nonconforming
people are explicitly excluded from the benefits of the ADA. Is this the result of homophobia?
The historical neglect of these intersections may be the result of the ways in which disability has
been ascribed to queer people as well as the ways in which disabled people have been ascribed
queerness, as justification for the exclusion and othering of both groups. It seems as though in
many ways, queer people and disabled people have been pitted against each other. Each group
pushes away either queerness or disability as a way to gain some small amount of cultural
leverage or privilege. Each group, fearing further isolation, victimization and discrimination
pushes the other further away from themselves, reenacting the structures of power and
oppression that have been so deftly constructed.
A major landmark of disability theory is the move from the individual model of disability
to disability as a social construction, no longer the fault of the individual, but produced by
society. GID may do well with a similar revisioning, one where the impairment one feels is due
to the social stigma and oppression that is experienced by trans and gender nonconforming
people through violence, discrimination, transphobia and denial of access to rights and services.
Theorists and activists involved in the debates around removal and revision of GID have much to
learn from modern disability theory and disabled people. McRuer’s argument and call for
critical investments and alliance of AIDS activist and disability activists exemplifies this. To
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make these connections, GID has been inserted in brackets where AIDS was used to show the
similarities and parallels in these movements.
I call in this essay for critical investments- an investment in disability theory on the part
of cultural workers concerned with [GID], an investment in [GID] and queer theory on
the part of disability activists . . . ‘Critical Investments’, is thus not meant to invoke
simply the economic investment of capitalism, where a single-minded focus on individual
returns invariably obscures collective interests . . . the critical investments I advocate for
in this essay would entail continually focusing on a queer/disabled collectivity,
surrounding [GID] theorists with a larger disability community and vice versa . . . I am in
fact critical of investments made according to the individualistic terms of an economic
system that has served neither people with [GID] nor people with disabilities well; I seek
instead to theorize critical practices that move beyond the limits of queer/disabled bodiescritical practices, that is, that refuse methodological distancing in order to further
systemic critique and coalition-building. (McRuer, 2002, p. 225-226)
This paper attempts to bridge the intersections of queer theory and disability theory in a
discussion of queer diagnoses in the DSM, to align causes in common, and to deconstruct the
ways in which homophobia, transphobia and ableism work hand in hand to oppress all queer and
disabled people. The hope will be for social work to start the process of undoing some of the
ways in which psychiatry and the medical-industrial complex has systemically marginalized and
oppressed all queer and disabled people, by acknowledging these intersections and moving
forward within a model of social justice. It is about moving beyond single-issue politics; it’s
about understanding the complexities of identities and lived experience. It is the understanding
that fighting for racial justice is queer; fighting for disability justice is queer.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION

Previously in this paper, we have looked at the ways in which the medical-industrial
complex and psychiatry have shamefully used gender to diagnose and categorize women’s
mental health. In many ways psychiatric medicine has policed gender in women by diagnosing
physical and psychic responses to oppression associating mental illness with femininity (Langer
& Martin, 2004; Lev, 2005; Manners, 2009; Ussher, 1991). Similarly, gender non-conformity
has been conflated with mental illness contemporarily and historically in the medical-industrial
complex (McHugh, 1992; Socarides, 1969; Siomopolous, 1974). Some scholars note “that there
is an intrinsic link between the century long oppression of women’s mental wellbeing within the
psycho-medical-industrial complex and the pathologization of gender non-conformity through
the psychiatric classification and treatment of GID” (Sennott, 2011, p. 94). The connection
between the policing of femininity and the policing of gender non-conformity are indeed parallel
as the assumed normative non-disordered gender identity is the masculine natal male, making all
other gender identities subject to scrutiny, misunderstanding and abuse by the medical-industrial
complex. Similarly, this argument can be extended to include the ways in which the long
oppression of disabled people by the medical-industrial complex is intrinsically linked to the
psychiatric classification and treatment of GID.
This paper has examined the ways in which the medical-industrial complex has sought to
cure and fix disability by creating a false binary between able bodied and disabled, much in the
same ways they have rigidly upheld the gender binaries of man and woman, and sexuality
binaries of heterosexual and homosexual. The medical model of transsexuality is rooted in this
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binary construction of gender, and a pathology of bodily difference rooted in ableism and the
construction of queer through disability. As Sennott & Smith (2011) note:
The awareness that the gender binary is a sociopolitical construct is founded on the
decoding of gender roles and expressions by feminist principles and traditions. However,
this decoding of identities, roles, and expressions was still founded on an essentialist
perspective that conflates designated sex, gender identity, gender expression, and sexual
orientation . . . Essentializing a client’s gender identity can be just as dangerous as
resorting to biological essentialism. This is the identity narrative that a gendernonconforming person is forced to adopt in order to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of
physical and mental health providers. Similarly, with this binary constrain to one’s
identity narrative, a gender nonconforming person is immediately compromised by a
pathologizing discourse and rhetoric that does not allow for the development of more
subtle, complex, and individualized expressions of gender identity. (p. 226)
The medical-industrial complex is notorious for its attempts to fit people into culturally
constructed boxes and to attempt to fix those that do not, the most obvious example being in the
diagnostic criteria for GID. This disallows for a variety of gender and trans experiences. Bodies
that do not conform to culturally normative experiences of gender are seen as pathological,
inferior, disabled, and a rigid outline for the fixing of these bodies policed and controlled by the
medical-industrial complex and dependent on a diagnosis of GID is outlined in the Standards of
Care, a widely used document in the mental health field. Similarly, both queerness and disability
have been used against each other not only in the creation of both disability and queerness, but
also in the justifications for exclusion. That is non-normative bodies and gender expressions are
often stigmatized and policed removing autonomy and self-expression. It is the policing of
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difference and more specifically, in this context, gender identities, which is problematic. Nonnormative sexualities, gender and bodies need not be stigmatized and pathologized by the everwidening medical-industrial complex.
The legacy of the medical model of transsexuality has constructed itself to police the
autonomy and decisions of trans and gender nonconforming people. Through this model, a
construction of diagnosis and cognitive authority has been created forcing trans and gender
nonconforming people to utilize the medical-industrial complex in order to receive access to not
only gender affirming treatments, but other important legal implications such as access to basic
civil rights and the change of gender markers on legal documents. This has made it such that a
majority of trans and/or gender nonconforming people seek therapy in the pursuit of a letter, with
a stamp of GID that is a “validation” from the medical-industrial complex of their known
identity in order to be granted access to these things. This creates problematic power structures
and a potential for the abuse of cognitive authority as gatekeepers decide who is “trans enough”.
What is of critical importance for both trans people and all mental health providers to
understand, is that one does not need the SOC, a diagnosis of GID, or a letter from an “expert” in
order to receive gender affirming treatments. The SOC and the “letter” are in fact a false gate
that have been built into real existence by the medical-industrial complex who see trans people
as unreliable and mentally ill, unable to make informed choices and decisions about their bodies.
The Standards of Care (SOC) are “recommended requirements”, not necessary a legally binding
framework. In fact, some agencies such as The Callen-Lourde Community Health Center in
New York City, Fenway Community Health Center in Boston, MA, the Holyoke Health Center
in Holyoke MA, The Castro-Mission Health Center in San Francisco, and others, use a model of
informed consent that allows people to access hormones without utilizing the SOC and a
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diagnosis of GID. More and more PCP’s (primary care physicians) prescribe gender-affirming
hormones to people under this model of informed consent (Douglas, 2009; Meininger, 2009).
Additionally, there are a few surgeons who will perform gender-affirming surgeries without a
letter.
It seems necessary that in the future, health agencies who utilize a model of informed
consent will exist across the country, not just in major cities, and that more doctors will
recognize their roles as activists and allies for their clients and prescribe hormones using a model
of informed consent within a social justice framework that recognizes the inherent limitation and
contradictions within the medical- industrial complex, while providing affirming and transparent
care within this context. It is the job of mental health providers to understand their role in this
movement and to act as allies and activists for their clients. If letters must be written, due to
limited access to medical practitioners who do utilize an informed consent model, then it is the
job of the therapist to co-author responsible and transparent letters that do not utilize the SOC,
but are rooted in the therapeutic relationship in an allyship and affirming model.
Gender Identity Disorder as a diagnosis in the DSM represents a highly controversial
issue within and around the transgender community with roots in the medical model of
transsexuality. As agents of social control, patriarchal psychomedical institutions have
diagnosed gender differences to ensure sociopolitical homeostasis and maintain disciplinary
authority (Butler, 2004). Arguments against GID arise out of this shared understanding of how
social and political gender policing has contributed to bias, violence, and abuse by psychiatric
and mental health professionals, forced institutionalization and continued oppression of
individuals based on their gender. Yet GID remains a complicated and controversial issue due to
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the double bind that it places many people into. Butler (2004) describes the contradiction as
such:
The debate is a very complex one, and that, in a way, those who want to keep the
diagnosis want to do so because it helps them achieve their aims and, in that sense,
realize their autonomy. And those who want to do away with the diagnosis want to do so
because it might make for a world in which they may be regarded and treated in nonpathological ways. I think we see here the concrete limits to any notion of autonomy that
establishes the individual as alone, free of social conditions, without dependency on
social instruments of various kinds. Autonomy is a social conditioned way of living in
the world. Those instruments, such as the diagnosis, can be enabling, but they can also
be restrictive and often they can function as both at the same time. (p. 77)
On the one hand diagnosis is often necessary in conjunction with other requirements for
medical and mental health services, as well as modification of name and gender on legal
documents, and many argue that the diagnosis of GID is necessary for legal protections and
access to medical and mental health services (Meyer et al., 2001; Pauly, 1992). At the same
time, in many cases the diagnosis of GID as a mental disorder undermines the need for medical
treatment and provides justification for insurance companies to deny coverage for gender
affirming treatment (Winters, 2005, 2008a, 2008b). In this paradox, systems often deny
coverage for transition related health care while requiring this care in other contexts, creating a
double bind, and a horribly demeaning and unjust situation for the many people who seek access
to treatments through the utilization of the medical-industrial complex.
The lived experiences of gender nonconforming individuals are complex and
multifaceted reflecting an infinite number of circumstances influenced by social, cultural,
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political and biological conditions. GID may hinder autonomy by eliminating the space for
persons who do not feel distress or impairment due to their gender identification, do not wish to
transition from one gender to another, or do not fit the trans narrative necessary to access a
diagnosis in the first place. GID, in effect, creates experience and narrative, and serves to
continue to propagate stereotypes and misunderstandings about the diversity and complex
multifaceted experiences present within the trans and gender nonconforming community.
Pathology, diagnosis and the medical model accommodate only some identities and experiences
thereby limiting autonomy by restricting forward movement of identities, narratives and
experience. It seems then that this inclusion versus removal debate should be challenged to
imagine other more inventive, expansive and just ways of experiencing identity and community.
Sennott and Smith (2011), argue for a transfeminist approach to working with gender
variant clients. “The transfeminist approach is an alternative therapeutic re-conceptualization of
feminist therapy based on the weaving of feminist thought, social justice frameworks, and
principles of allyship” (Sennott, 2011, p. 102). The transfeminist approach assumes that gender
identity is co-constructed in accordance with what feels authentic, ego syntonic and sincere as
one relates to the world and others within social and cultural constraints (Sennott & Smith,
2011). A therapist who adopts the transfeminist approach works to,
Disassemble the essentialist assumption of the normativity of the sex/gender congruence
and acknowledges that those who do not fit neatly into on sex/gender/gender expression
category or another can still feel as though they belong inside a gender identity and
expression continuum that is not confined within the binary. (Sennott, 2011, p. 103)
That is to say, non-normative bodies and identities are valid conceptions of self and represent the
wide diversity of gender and gender expression in humanity. Additionally, the transfeminist
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approach outlines four fundamental therapeutic approaches to working with trans and gender
nonconforming people:
1. A hierarchy of authentic, lived experience for women does not exist.
2. To privilege one type of womanhood or femaleness over another is inherently antifeminist.
3. No one individual, group, or type of woman can define what it means to be a woman.
4. Most trans and/or gender – nonconforming individuals have lived experience as a girl
or a woman and have suffered the direct repercussions of socially condoned misogyny
and systemic gender-based oppression. (Sennott & Smith, 2011, p. 225)
This approach is clearly based in feminist principles, and Sennott & Smith (2011) are well aware
of the early mistakes of first and second wave feminism. They identify the problems of early
feminism and suggest tools and implications for moving forward with transfeminism:
We encourage clinicians to be careful not to make assumptions, similar to those made by
early waves of feminism and, in so doing, neglect the important differences that exist in
our gendered selves. Feminism began as a movement for white women with class and
economic privilege. Differences concerning class and race were ignored, leaving entire
communities of women without a place in feminism. The history of feminism has taught
us that there are as many ways to be a woman as there are women. Furthermore, trans
rights are women’s rights, which are also reproductive justice rights. This is evident in
trans people’s fight for fair and affirming medical and mental health treatment and the
basic right for control and autonomy over their bodies, including access to genderaffirming hormones, surgery, and other gender-affirming treatment. We advocate a
transfeminist approach to gender justice that does not privilege the experience of one type
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of woman over another and that similarly recognizes that there are as many different
ways to express gender as there are people. The vast difference in the makeup of our
intersecting identities is a critical component of the conversation around gender and the
gender justice movement. (Sennott & Smith, 2011, p. 224-225)
This acknowledgment of the early limitations of feminism, are often ignored, and the
intersections of trans rights with reproductive justice, and women’s rights, is an important piece
of just practice with trans and gender nonconforming people. To deepen this conversation it is
critically important to acknowledge the legacy of ableism in the feminist and LGBTQ movement
and the intersections of disability justice with gender justice. The end of this chapter will
suggest some possible ways in which modern disability theory can continue to expand feminist
thinking and work with trans and gender nonconforming people.
The transfeminist approach realizes that the role of gender expert in working with trans
and gender nonconforming clients has a strong footing in much scholarship and discussion
around working with trans and gender nonconforming clients, creating much fear and
apprehension by those who do not feel competent enough to engage in this work. Sennott and
Smith (2011) through their work with the non profit organization Translate Gender have
conducted trainings and workshops in which they ask therapists and doctors to speak openly and
candidly about their countertransference, prejudices, assumptions, phobias and fears when
working with trans and gender nonconforming people. They summarize clinician’s fears as
such:
The greatest fear that clinicians have in working with differently gendered clients is that
they are not properly educated or trained to work with a differently gendered population.
This includes therapist’s concerns about ‘blind spots’ in treatment, fear of saying the
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wrong thing’ or ‘messing up a person’s pronouns’, ‘overthinking’ instead of being
present and mindful with a client, and not having enough resources and knowledge to
effectively advocate for a client. If a therapist feels this way . . . it is critical they begin
the process of self education and self awareness . . . This action can include, but is not
limited to, taking responsibility for continuing ones education through research and
study, trainings and workshops, and accessing online resources. . . supervision with a
peer group or a therapist knowledgeable in the areas of gender and sexuality to allow for
the exploration of one’s own assumptions, stereotypes, and countertransference in
working with differently gendered clients. (Sennott & Smith, 2011, p. 228)
There is no mention of expert, or expertise in this approach. The client remains the
expert on themselves and their own gender and identity. One does not need to be an expert in
order to work with trans and/or gender nonconforming people. In fact, it seems as though the
creation of gender or transgender experts in the mental health field contributes to the problematic
power relationships already present in the policing of trans bodies and experiences. Sennott &
Smith (2011) offer this advice to clinicians:
No one can tell another person what his or her gender is; only an individual can know
this. We advise clinicians to consistently recognize that when clients state their gender
identity there should be no argument, no question, and no doubt as to whether or not this
is the person’s ‘real’ gender identity. It is the responsibility and obligation of mental
health providers to realize this and recognize that they do not hold the responsibility of
deciding a person’s gender identity. That is for the person to decide and the therapist to
mirror and affirm. It is a personal identification, not something that can be assigned,
diagnosed or pathologized. (p. 222)
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Any culturally competent therapist with an understanding of the separate and distinct continuums
of sex, gender, gender expression and sexuality, that is rooted in a social justice model that
acknowledges the intersection of other identities such as race, class and ability, is capable of
working with trans and gender nonconforming clients and providing them with the services they
need want and deserve. This means, continually educating oneself by attending workshops and
conferences and by reading scholarship and research written and conducted by trans and gender
nonconforming people, by exploring one’s own gender identity and expression, and seeking out
the support and supervision of like minded therapists. The work lies in the therapist’s ability to
understand their own bias, stereotypes, and the ways in which their own gender identity and
expression may or may not fit socially constructed roles. There is no better tool then selfawareness. This approach in many ways overturns the cognitive authority held by many
professionals in the field. Instead of assuming the therapist knows what is best, the transfeminist
model requires that clinicians educate themselves, examine their own belief systems around
gender, and utilize a social justice framework, placing the needs and experiences of the client in
the forefront of therapeutic work. “Another common concern of therapists is that they will
unconsciously perpetuate the systems of oppression within the therapeutic relationship” (Sennott
& Smith, 2011, p. 228), thereby recreating exclusion and stigmatization in the therapeutic
relationship. It is vital for a socially just therapist to consider the ways in which different aspect
of identities affect sex, gender identity, gender expression/impression and sexuality. Sennott &
Smith recognize that,
Race, class, size, ability, national origin, religion, first language and citizenship all play
roles in how we may or may not express our gender, how we have come to understand
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ourselves and our gender roles, and the ways in which our genders are perceived by
communities and society. (p. 224)
By doing so, conversations are able to form around how individuals are affected by both
privilege and oppression, and the ways in which individuals have been socialized to maintain
both these privileges and oppressions. It is important to acknowledge that mistakes may happen,
but it is critical to acknowledge and name these mistakes, apologize, hold themselves
accountable and move forward. Feelings of guilt around mistakes are never useful to the client
(Sennott & Smith, 2011).
One of the most important aspects of the transfeminist approach is the acknowledgment
of the myriad of mistreatment, abuse and pathologization that trans and gender nonconforming
people have experienced at the hands of the medical-industrial complex throughout the course of
history. “Historically, the medical establishment has supported both physical and psychological
trauma to trans and gender-nonconforming people . . . it is important to acknowledge the
collective multigenerational trauma that has been experienced by the trans community (Sennott
& Smith, 2011, p. 228). Rarely within the “helping professions” does one practitioners willing
and able to recognize and speak to some of the more disturbing and unhelpful aspects of the
medical-industrial complex. As we will see in the quote below, the transfeminist approach not
only acknowledges this trauma and history of abuse but also incorporates it into a deeper
understanding of clients experience in the therapeutic alliance.
While it is highly likely that trans and gender-nonconforming people have lived through
some form of maltreatment by medical and mental health professionals, those who have
not are often aware of the history that the medical-industrial complex has played in the
lives of other trans community members . . . The Internet allows access to others’ lived
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experiences, and often it is through remote connections that community members inform
one another of injustices and particularly triggering or traumatizing experiences with
health care providers. As a result, it is highly likely that a gender-nonconforming person
sitting in the office of a mental health professional may be wary and guarded due to either
lived experienced or vicarious experience of collective trauma. For this reason, trans and
gender-nonconforming people may not enter treatment with the same mutuality, trust and
helping relationship of other clients. They may be guarded and worried, hypervigilant,
and reluctant . . . Concerns and fears should be acknowledged, validated, and normalized
through recognition of the harms that the medical establishment has perpetrated against
members of the trans and gender-nonconforming community. (Sennott & Smith, 2011, p.
229)
Sennott & Smith (2011) also outline other fears and concerns a trans or gender nonconforming
client may have. These fears may include, having all concerns brought into therapy connected to
one’s gender by the therapist, assumptions about gender identity stemming from abuse, identity
being seen as a “phase”, having to educate the therapist around basic issues, not being believed
or validated in assertions of gender identity, being forced to fit into binary gender roles, and not
being “trans enough” to access letters, legal documentation and gender affirming treatments
(Sennott & Smith, 2011). As one can see, many clients report fears that are directly related to
the medicalization of trans bodies and experience and their experiences of trauma directly or
vicariously within the medical-industrial complex. The transfeminist approach encourages
clinicians to mirror and affirm language and identities, not to conceptualize every issue as
relating to gender identity, ask questions from a place of exploring a client’s feelings rather then
from a desire for self-education. Also, it is important for therapists to decide on a policy for letter
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writing before meeting with individual clients and to be aware of resources within communities
that do not require a letter but rely on informed consent in order to create a space where both
client and clinician are free to explore other aspects of the therapeutic relationship (Sennott &
Smith, 2011).
Through the major advances of the social model of disability one can see the ways in
which society actually causes disability in individuals. Similarly, “The DSM does not account
for the difference between distress or impairment that is inherent to the psychology of an
individual and that which is a result of oppressive sociocultural structures” (Sennott, 2011, p.
95). This is to say, too often distress in the lives of trans and gender nonconforming people is
blamed and placed on the individual, much in the same way that individuals are often assumed
responsible for their disabilities. Instead, disability theory has taught us that much of disability is
a result of societal oppressions and barriers, stereotyping and discrimination. It seems, then,
following in the footsteps of disability theory, that at the very start of this debate should be the
move away from the individual model of GID to the societal model of GID.
“Instead of recognizing that the moral failure lies in society’s unwillingness to embrace
different gender identities and expressions, society blames transgender and gender
nonconforming people for bringing discrimination and violence on themselves” (Grant, Mottett,
& Tanis, 2010). It is time for professionals to start unpacking some of these complications in
work with trans and gender nonconforming people and it is time for the APA to stop the
unethical practice of including diagnosis based on perceived cultural norms and values. In 2010 a
study of 6,450 trans and gender nonconforming individuals reported that, “Health outcomes for
all categories of respondents show the appalling effects of social and economic marginalization,
including much higher rates of HIV infection, smoking, drug and alcohol use and suicide
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attempts than the general population” (Grant, Mottett, & Tanis, 2010). The negative effects of
transphobia and transgender oppression from mental health and other health care professionals
has disastrous implications for the kinds of treatment, services and care trans and gender
nonconforming people receive (or don’t) from their providers. The transfeminist model, rooted
in activism and social justice with an awareness around the interconnectedness of the
construction and pathology of queer and/or disabled people may be the best way to start to
transform the harm that has been done, and continues to be perpetrated in the medical-industrial
complex towards all queer and/or disabled people.
While moving towards an understanding of impairment as caused by social conditions of
oppression, one must also remember the critiques of the social model of disability. Clare (2001)
reminds individuals to:
pay attention to our bodies- our stolen bodies and our reclaimed bodies. To the wisdom
that tells us the causes of the injustice we face lie outside of our bodies, and also to the
profound relationship our bodies have to that injustice, to the ways our identities are
inextricably linked to our bodies. (p. 364)
The advancement of disability theory is critical but it must continue to pay particular attention to
the critiques of a social model that argue this model may be as narrow and rigid in defining
experience as earlier models. Resistance theory emphasizes the use of multiple voices
containing a variety of experiences as a way to enlarge the understanding of everyone and to
overcome disagreements and move beyond singular interests thereby incorporating “resistance
within social movements as a tool for transforming the target of their resistance- the larger
society” (Gabel & Peter, 2004, p. 593).
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Similarly, those who work for disability justice and continue to write disability theory
should do so with a crip queer consciousness and explore the connections between GID and the
pathology of disability to forge new understandings of the hope as well as the limitations of
pursuing disability rights for the treatment and consideration of trans and gender nonconforming
people. For as it stands now, trans and gender nonconforming people seem to live in a double
bind, that is they are at once dependent on the medical model of transsexuality for access to
services, and yet denied access to services, as well as denied basic legal protections due to their
gender identities. It seems as though demanding services for queers highlights,
The tension between transgression and inclusion, dissidence and accession to the
dominant legal and political order. Claims to full citizenship based on equal rights or
recognition run the risk that the responsibilities imposed on sexual minorities as the
“trade-off” in these circumstances will amount to an extension of disciplinary power,
thereby compromising the transgressive potential of alternative sexualities and sexual
practices. (Grabham, 2007, p. 37)
That is to say both queer and/or disabled communities, activists, theorists and academics must at
once weigh both the risks and benefits of inclusion, equal rights, in continuing to follow in a
model controlled by the medical-industrial complex. It seems necessary, that the debate around
GID remain decidedly queer, and that the community will continue to push the problematic
relationship of cognitive authority, challenge the problematic construction of equal rights and
remain an active public dissent to dominant systems.
The concept of sexual dissent . . . forges a connection among sexual expressions,
oppositional politics, and claims public space. Because sexual representations construct
identities (they do not merely reflect preexisting ones), restriction and regulation of
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sexual expression aimed at sexual minorities and gender nonconformists . . . What the
right wing wishes to eliminate is our power to invent and represent ourselves and to
redefine our politics. They know our public sexual expression is political, and that is
how we must defend it. Rather then invoking fixed, natural identities and asking only for
privacy or an end to discrimination, we must expand our right to public sexual dissent.
This is the path of access to public discourse and political representation. (Duggan &
Hunter, 1995, p. 5)
This dissent must be enacted as complete resistance to compulsory ablebodiness and compulsory
heterosexuality, “crips and queers should insist on teaching straight culture the lessons they have
learned from dissent and on understanding dissent as a central component of progressive political
agency” (McRuer & Wilkerson, 2003, p. 10). Through the examination of these oppressive
structures and systems, both historically and contemporarily an understanding will occur that
centers on justice and, “a recognition that another world can exist in which an incredible variety
of bodies and minds are valued and identities shaped, where crips and queers have effectively
(because repeatedly) displaced the able-bodies/disabled binary” (McRuer and Wilkerson, 2003,
p. 14). Disability and queerness are at the center in the movement for social justice, and with a
crip queer consciousness, another world is possible.
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